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ABSTRACT
The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a $871.6 million industry. Well over
$700 million of this annual income is generated from the media, giving collegiate athletics a
national platform. This brings both opportunities and downfalls to amateur athletes who play
NCAA sports and the journalists who report on their sporting events. Conflict often arises on the
playing field and can continue off the field. With high profile athletic events aired nation-wide,
comments are bound to be made about the athletes involved in the game. Some comments may
even rise to the level of defamation. Through an in-depth examination of published court cases,
this thesis explored whether a court would classify a student-athlete as a public official, public
figure, or private person in a defamation suit. The thesis also examined whether the studentathlete would have to prove actual malice or negligence to win a defamation claim filed against a
member of the news media or a social media user.
Although few cases addressed the plaintiff status of a collegiate student-athlete or the
level of fault required for a collegiate student-athlete to prove in a defamation claim, this thesis
found that collegiate student-athletes would not be considered public officials. Rather, the thesis
found that courts have found coaches and athletes to be either limited-purpose public figures or
private persons, depending upon their level of access to media, their engagement with media
regarding matters of public controversy, and their involvement in controversies. If courts
consider collegiate student-athletes to be limited-purpose public figures in defamation suits
regarding matters of public concern, the student-athletes may have to prove actual malice to win
a defamation claim. If courts consider collegiate student-athletes to be private persons in
defamation suits not related to matters of public concern, the student-athletes may have to prove
negligence to win a defamation claim.

v

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“If all printers were determined not to print anything till they were sure it would offend nobody,
there would be very little printed.”1
A. Josh Boutte, a Recent Example
Louisiana State University (LSU) faced the University of Wisconsin (Wisconsin) in a
pre-season game, with nation-wide television coverage on September 3, 2016, at Lambeau Field
in Green Bay, Wisconsin. 2 With less than one minute left in the fourth quarter, the score was
close. Tension rose as LSU trailed Wisconsin by two points in the 14–16 game.3 The LSU
quarterback received the snap, only to throw an interception right into the arms of Wisconsin’s
D’Cota Dixon.4 The play arguably ended and Dixon celebrated the pass with his arm in the air
and index finger pointing to the sky.5 Seconds later, LSU’s offensive lineman, Josh Boutte,
charged across the field. Boutte hit Dixon full force and knocked him to the ground. Officials
threw their penalty flags and ejected Boutte from the game for a “flagrant hit.”6
Immediately, a national conversation began. The Internet roared with comments
concerning Josh Boutte’s hit to D’Cota Dixon. 7 Viewers took to Twitter,8 tweeting their opinions

1

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN APOLOGY FOR PRINTERS 7 (Randolph Goodman)(1955).

2

Jim Kleinpeter, LSU v. Wisconsin Game Breakdown, THE TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 2, 2016,
http://www.nola.com/lsu/index.ssf/2016/09/lsu_vs_wisconsin_game_breakdow.html.
3

Andrew Lopez, LSU OL Josh Boutte ejected for flagrant his after Brandon Harris interception,
THE TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 3, 2016,
http://www.nola.com/lsu/index.ssf/2016/09/lsu_ol_josh_boutte_ejected_for.html.
4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.
1

of the hit they witnessed on television. 9 The comments were not limited to social media users;
sports journalists also criticized the hit.10
Conflict often arises on the playing field and can continue off the field.11 The tweets
about Josh Boutte addressed him as a person and a player. 12 Similar critical comments are often
made about student-athletes across the athletic arena.13 With this narrative and so many like them
occurring almost weekly in collegiate athletics, one must wonder if such statements rise to the

8

Twitter is a social network platform in which users can publish their thoughts in less than 140
characters.
9

Lopez, supra note 3. See, e.g., John (@flashzonephoto), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2016, 7:54 AM),
https://twitter.com/flashzonephoto/status/772795144638640129 (last visited Feb 24, 2017); Jeff
Smithmier (@JSmithmier), TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2016, 9:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/JSmithmier/status/772276581746171906 (last visited Feb 24, 2017).
10

See, e.g., Trevor Matich (@TMatich), TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2015, 5:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/TMatich/status/772213028548780032 (last visited Feb 24, 2017); Ryan
McCrystal (@Ryan_McCrystal), TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2016, 4:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/Ryan_McCrystal/status/772206436248002560 (last visited Feb 24, 2017);
Kadeem Simmons, Athletes Need to Accept Criticism, THE PEOPLE’S DAILY MORNING STAR, Jan.
25, 2017, https://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-e36b-Athletes-need-to-acceptcriticism#.WMleExiZO3U;
11

See, e.g., Alysha Tsuji, Multiple people had to hold back Doc Rivers as he furiously tried to go
after refs and was ejected, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2016, http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/11/docrivers-clippers-ejected-furious-refs-hold-back-deandre-jordan-sam-cassell.
12

John, supra note 9; Smithmier, supra note 11; Matich, supra note 13; McCrystal, supra note
15.
13

See, e.g., Nicole Auerbach, The good and bad of Twitter and college athletes, USA TODAY,
Jan. 10, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/other/2013/01/10/college-athletestwitter-criticism-johnny-manziel-kentucky/1823959/.

2

level of defamation14 and how a court would assess the appropriate level of fault to apply if an
athlete filed a lawsuit.
B. The NCAA and the Amateur Ceiling
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the nonprofit organization
governing the collegiate athletic industry. 15 The 460,000 competitors of the NCAA are often
referred to as “student-athletes.”16 The name student-athlete, conveys its exact meaning—
athletes attending a college or university in an effort to obtain a degree while participating in a
highly competitive athletic arena. Additionally, each student-athlete must maintain amateur
status.17 This means the athletes refrain from activities such as entering into contracts with
professional sports teams, playing with professional athletes, or accepting any form of payment
for their athletic skill. 18

14

According to Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems, defamation is a tort
in which “[t]he law [of defamation] addresses injury to reputation by communications—usually
words.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 12 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
15

Revenue, NCAA (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/.
finances/revenue.
16

Student-Athletes, NCAA (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes.

17

NCAA, NCAA ELIGIBILITY CENTER: 2016-2017 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENTATHLETE 24 (2016).
Id. According to the NCAA, in order to maintain amateur status, a student-athlete cannot “sign
a contract with a professional team, play with professionals, participate in tryouts or practices
with a professional team, accept payments or preferential benefits for playing sports, accept prize
money above your expenses, accept benefits from an agent or prospective agent, agree to be
represented by an agent, or delay your full-time college enrollment to play in organized sports
competitions.” Id.
18

3

Despite being a nonprofit sports organization solely comprised of amateur athletes, the
NCAA generates a great deal of revenue, bringing in $871.6 million annually. 19 College sporting
events and collegiate athletes are heavily covered by the news media. In fact, well over $700
million, or eighty-one percent, of the NCAA’s revenue was generated from the media. 20 Due to
their fourteen-year-contract with CBS Sports and Turner Broadcasting, collegiate athletics are
given a national platform, bringing both opportunities and downfalls to the amateur athletes who
make up the playing field and the journalists who report on their sporting events. 21 For these
reasons, it is imperative to address the rights of both journalists and athletes involved in the
industry by exploring whether courts consider athletes to be public figures.
C. Holt v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.
Central to this thesis is the case of Holt v. Cox Enterprise in which Darwin Holt, a former
football player for the University of Alabama (“Alabama”), sued Cox Enterprises, Inc. for libel 22
and invasion of privacy.23 The cause of action stemmed from The Tuscaloosa News in which a
series of five articles were published in the Sunday Atlanta Journal and Constitution.24 The

19

Revenue, NCAA (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/.
finances/revenue. The most recent revenue report from the NCAA was given
in 2011-2012.
20

Id.

21

Id.

Libel is “written or visual defamation.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-10 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
22

23

Holt v. Cox Enters., 590 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

24

Id. at 410. The articles were written by Darrell Simmons, defendant to the action. The fact that
Holt commented on the incident is a significant element in determining if Holt is a public figure
or private person under defamation law. Following Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., whether the
plaintiff “thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence others” was a
4

articles revisited the famous hit between Alabama’s Darwin Holt and Georgia Tech’s Chick
Graning during the “highly publicized football game” between the University of Alabama and
Georgia Tech.25 The publications cited many comments made about Holt following the game and
included phrases describing the hit such as, “old Alabama greeting “pow” right in the kisser, a
“cheap shot” a “flying elbow,” Holt’s “latest act of violence,” an “illegal” blow, and the striking
of Graning “so savage[e] and unexplainabl[e].” 26 The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia found the published statements about Holt referred to his experience as a
college athlete and injured his reputation to the degree of rising to defamation.27 Consequently,
the court deemed Holt a limited-purpose public figure,29 which escalated his burden of proving

significant element in determining if the plaintiff was a public figure or private person for
purposes of a defamation claim.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER,
AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-35 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1974)).
25

Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 409–410.

26

Id. at 411.

27

Id.

29

In a defamation case, the court will consider the plaintiff either a public figure or a private
person. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the court defined a public figure as, “those who “occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes” and, “more commonly,” and a limited-purpose public figure as those who “have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS 1-33–1-34 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
New York Times v. Sullivan declared public officials must prove actual malice in order to meet
their burden of proof in defamation cases. Id. at 1-36 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S.
254, 285-286 (1964)). Actual malice was established in New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 1-13.
The Court defined actual malice as, “publication with knowledge that the offending statement is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” Id. at 1-25 (quoting N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254). In contrast, a plaintiff considered a private person by the court in a
defamation case is to adopt the burden of proof set forth by that particular state “so long as it
does not provide for liability without ‘fault.’” Id. at 6-2 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418
U.S. 323, 347 (1974). Thirty-six states, including Louisiana, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
5

fault to that of proving “actual malice.”30 In New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court
established actual malice31 The Court defined actual malice as, “publication with knowledge that
the offending statement is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” 32 This
standard provided more protection to the media against being held liable for harming the
reputation of public officials and public figures on a matter of public concern. 33 Unable to prove
actual malice, Holt failed in his effort to recover damages.34
This thesis specifically focuses on whether college athletes are considered public
officials, public figures, or private persons. Additionally, this thesis explores whether college
athletes must prove actual malice or negligence in the event they bring a defamation claim
against a media defendant. For example, if Josh Boutte were to bring a suit against a journalist
today for comments similar to those deemed defamatory in Holt, would Boutte also be

Rico adopted negligence as the burden of proof for a private person claiming defamation. Id. at
6-3–6-5.
30

Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 412-13. See also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-13 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
31

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-13
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32

Id. at 1-25.

33

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-30–131 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010). The justices understood the difficulty in a journalist’s job of
trying to report to the public while still trying to quote speakers verbatim. Id. at 1-30–1-31. “So
long as the gist of a quotation is correct, errors that do not materially change the meaning of the
statement do no constitute “actual malice” even when they are made deliberately.” Id. at 1-30–131.
34

Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 413.

6

considered a limited-purpose public figure who must prove the defamatory statements were
published with actual malice?36
D. The Goal
Through an in-depth examination of published court cases, this thesis examined whether
college athletes suing media defendants for defamation must prove actual malice or negligence.44
In doing so, this thesis outlined the distinction between classifying a plaintiff as a public or
private person in a defamation suit and circumstances under which a college athlete plaintiff
should be considered a public figure. Additionally, this thesis examined First Amendment
protections granted to journalists and whether such protections also extend to civilian social
media users who publish potentially defamatory online statements about college athletes.

36

Holt v. Cox Enterprises, Inc. is distinguishable from the question at hand in that Holt brought
his cause of action over twenty years following the incident. By the time Holt brought legal
action his amateur collegiate athletic career was complete. Additionally, Holt spoke publicly on
the Holt-Graining hit.
Negligence, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, is “[t]he failure to exercise the standard of
care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation.” Negligence,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (10th ed. 2014).
44

7

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
A. Defamation, Understanding the Basics
The law of defamation is rooted deep within principles that evolved via common law and
via U.S. Supreme Court rulings involving constitutional questions.45 In its most basic sense,
defamation is the law addressing “injury to reputation by communications—usually words.”46
The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains how “injury to reputation” is a result of a
communication that “harm[s] the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” 47 This sort of injury
is a tort—a cause of action that brings about the potential for damage awards to the plaintiff.48
The two branches of defamation are libel and slander.49 Libel is defamation in a written
or visual form while slander is oral or spoken defamation. 50 Courts are firm in considering the
context of the statement to determine if it is defamatory, but they still look at the publication as a
whole, refusing to segregate one phrase from the rest of the work. 51 The words in question are
taken for their plain meaning or as “a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the entire

45

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-2
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
46

Id. at 1-2. Opinions and rulings differ in determining what language rises to the level of
defamation based on the jurisdiction of litigation. Id. at 2-13.
47

Id. at 2-15 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977)).

48

Id. at 1-2.

49

Id. at 2-10.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 1-25 (citing Julian v. Am. Bus. Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 23, 155 N.Y.S.2D 1, 137
N.E.2d 1 (1956)). This is particularly true where books, broadcasts, letters, newspapers,
periodicals, and advertisements are concerned. Id. at 2-21.
8

statement.”52 The plain meaning provides a more narrow understanding of the language and
prevents the speech in question from being taken out of context or read in an overbroad
manner.53 Additionally, The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following elements to
make a prime facie54 case for a defamation claim:
a.
b.
c.
d.

A false and defamatory statement concerning another;
An unprivileged publication to a third party;
Fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
Either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.55

In a defamation claim, a court categorizes the plaintiff as either a public official, a public
figure, limited-purpose public figure, or a private person.56 A public official, public figure, or

Id. at 2-22 (quoting Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Publ’g Co., 149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504
(1950)).
52

53

Id. at 2-23.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a prime facie case is, “(1) The establishment of a legally
required rebuttable presumption. (2) A party's production of enough evidence to allow the facttrier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor.” Prima Facie Case, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1382 (10th ed. 2014).
54

55

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-6
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
56

New York Times v. Sullivan declared public officials must prove actual malice in order to meet
their burden of proof in defamation cases. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-36 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (citing N.Y. Times Co.,
376 U.S. at 285-286). Actual malice was established in New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 1-13.
The Court defined actual malice as, “publication with knowledge that the offending statement is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” Id. at 1-25 (quoting N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan 376). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court defined a public figure as, “those who
“occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes” and, “more commonly,” those who “have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” Id. at
1-33–1-34 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). In contrast, a plaintiff considered a private person by
the court in a defamation case is to adopt the burden of proof set forth by that particular state “so
long as it does not provide for liability without “fault.” Id. at 6-2 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974)). Thirty-six states, including Louisiana, the District of Columbia,
9

limited-purpose public figure must show actual malice in order to recover pecuniary damages for
a defamation claim. 57 Actual malice is a heightened standard of proving fault established in New
York Times v. Sullivan.58 The Court defined it as a statement made “with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”59 In other words, the plaintiff
must clearly and concisely prove the defendant knew the statement was false and published it
anyway with reckless disregard for the truth. 60
In contrast, a private person adopts the burden of proof set forth by that particular state
“so long as it does not provide for liability without “fault.”61 The majority of the states adopted
negligence as the burden of proving fault for a private person.62 Negligence is a lesser standard
to that of actual malice. It requires the application of the “reasonable person” test which asks if a
reasonable person under reasonable circumstances or reasonable industry practices knew or
would have known the statement was defamatory. 63

and Puerto Rico adopted negligence as the burden of proof for a private person claiming
defamation. Id. at 6-3–6-5.
57

Id. at 1-36 (citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254).

58

Id. at 1-13.

59

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)

60

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-8
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 285—86).
61

Id. at 6-2 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).

62

Id. at 6-3–6-5.

63

Id. at 6-6.
10

Starting in 1964, defamation law evolved across the country as a result of U.S. Supreme
Court rulings.64 This jurisprudence challenged the Court in balancing the necessity of justice for
those harmed by defamation while still honoring the First Amendment right to free speech. 65
B. The Case Law Evolution of Defamation
1. New York Times v. Sullivan
In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a new frontier in defamation law. 66 For the first
time, the Court decided the degree of constitutional protection afforded to a “public official,”
L.B. Sullivan, in his defamation claim against four African American Ministers and The New
York Times Company.67
Sullivan was the Commissioner of Public Affairs responsible for supervising the police,
fire, cemetery, and sales departments in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1960.68 In March of 1960,
The “Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South”
purchased an advertisement in the New York Times at the price of $4,552. 69 The goal of the
advertisement was to “draw attention to King’s plight through a full-page ad in the New York
Times that would also call attention to the sit-in movement generally and events in Montgomery

64

Id. at 1-2.

65

Id.

66

N.Y. Times Co. 376 U.S. at 256.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL-RIGHTS, LIBEL
LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 15 (2011).

11

specifically.”70 On March 28, 1960, members of the “Committee to Defend Martin Luther King
and the Struggle for Freedom in the South” met to discuss the article—the committee members
feared “the ad lacked emotional appeal, so much so that the civil rights leader worried that it
would not generate enough of a response to cover the $4,552 charged by the Times to run it.”71
As a result, the committee members added a list of names, attacking sixty-four community
members who held a public position.72 The list was endorsed by four Alabama Ministers without
their consent— Ralph D. Abernathy, Solomon S. Seay Sr. , Fred L. Shuttlesworth, and Joseph E.
Lowery.73
The advertisement ran in the New York Times on March 29, 1960.74 It highlighted the
peaceful civil rights demonstrations of “Southern Negro students.”75 The goal of the
advertisement was to raise awareness for Dr. Martin Luther King’s legal needs as he was in
prison pending a perjury indictment. 76 Additionally, this advertisement spoke publicly on the
“wave of terror” the demonstrators faced in their efforts to garner support for the civil rights
movement, obtain the right to vote, and foster support for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 77 This

70

Id. at 16.

71

Id. at 17.

72

N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 257. The sixty-four people named in the advertisement were
involved in trade unions, performing arts, public affairs, religious organizations, and more. Id.
73

KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL-RIGHTS, LIBEL
LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 17 (2011).
74

Id. at 18.

75

N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256.

76

Id. at 257.

77

Id.
12

“wave of terror” was a stab at the list of sixty-four community members listed within the
advertisement, all of which held some sort of public position.78
The advertisement told the story of police officers who “ringed the Alabama State
College Campus” with shotguns and tear-gas when they dispelled a group of students singing
“My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ at the State Capital. 79 The advertisement alleged how student
protests were met with officers padlocking the dining hall “in an attempt to starve them into
submission.”80
Following the publication of the advertisement, Sullivan brought suit against the four
ministers and The New York Times Company seeking $500,000 in damages.81 The plaintiff
claimed that although he was not mentioned by name, the reference to the police “ringing” the
campus and bringing a “wave of terror” was an accusation directed toward Sullivan as
Commissioner of Public Affairs and his authority over the police force.82 The goal of Sullivan
and other commissioners was “to punish the Times and, through a victory in court yielding large
damages, to stop the Times and other northern media from reporting what they considered a
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 256.

82

Id. at 258.
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biased and unfair view of events in the South.” 83 The Alabama jury trial found the New York
Times Company and the four ministers liable for defamation.84
The U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Sullivan’s case on review to decide whether “an
action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of
speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” 85 In his
opinion, Justice Brennan revisited Whitney v. California and expressed his deepest concerns with
keeping public issues a part of a wide-open debate.86 In his New York Times v. Sullivan opinion,
Justice Brennan quoted Justice Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney which stated:
[I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievance and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. . . .
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 87
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KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL-RIGHTS, LIBEL
LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 45 (2011).
84

Id. at 68.
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Id. at 268.

In Whitney v. California, Justice Sanford stated, “That the freedom of speech which is secured
by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever
one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use
of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that a State in
the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical
to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the
foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open
to question. Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
86

87

N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. It is worth noting that recent scholarship on Brandeis
connects the use of this language in Whitney v. California to the modern conceptualization of
free expression rights. Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy and Speech, 63
Vanderbilt L.J. 1295, 1342 (2010).
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Justice Brennan held firm to the belief that the First Amendment allowed citizens to
discuss public officials and public matters even if such conversation bred unpleasant thoughts
and reactions.88 Charged with writing the opinion, Justice Brennan provided new guidelines:
The case had to be reversed, a standard had to be articulated comparable to those
in the obscenity and denaturalization cases, a rule of actual malice had to be
included, and comments on public officials and their work had to be distinguished
from attacks on private citizens. 89
As a result, the Court ruled, for the first time, that in order for a public official to recover
punitive damages in a defamation claim related to the official’s duties, the official must prove the
alleged defamatory statement was made with actual malice. 90 The Court found that “the evidence
was incapable of supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made
of and concerning Sullivan. 91 The Court also found the evidence did not indicate the newspaper
published the advertisement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the
truth.92 Therefore, Sullivan could not prove actual malice— the case was reversed and remanded,

N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. Justice Brennan’s school of thought was a more broad
approach than the fair-comment doctrine—a doctrine that allowed for open comment on “matters
of public interest” so long as those comments “were both “reasonable” and based upon facts
fairly stated or known to the recipients of the communications.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON
DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-13 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
88
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KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL-RIGHTS, LIBEL
LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 165 (2011).
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N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270–80. Actual malice is a standard of law that requires the
plaintiff to prove the defendant made the alleged defamatory statement “with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Proof of actual malice is only
required when the plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Id. at 283. If the plaintiff seeks general
damages, actual malice is presumed. Id.
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KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL-RIGHTS, LIBEL
LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 179 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 288–89.
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and the New York Times Company and the four ministers were found not to be liable for
defamation.93
The ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was significant because it was the first time
a uniform standard was made by a unanimous Supreme Court regarding public officials in libel
suits.94 Additionally, the standard was one of a heightened degree. 95 In proving actual malice, the
public official was required to show the presence of actual malice with the “convincing clarity
which the constitutional standard demands.”96 Consequently, fault became a constitutional
requirement in cases involving media defendants.
Although Sullivan fell short in meeting his burden of proof, the New York Times victory
brought enormous advancement to the law on defamation. Setting such a high standard greatly
broadened the scope of the First Amendment, affording more protection to journalists.97 This
ruling was so significant that Dean Prosser declared it “unquestionably the greatest victory won
by the defendants in the modern history of the law of torts.” 98
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LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 179 (2011).
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(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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2. Curtis v. Butts
The law on defamation evolved yet again in 1967 when the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed a defamation claim involving a “public figure” in Curtis Publishing Company v.
Butts.99
Wally Butts was the athletic director at the University of Georgia (Georgia) when he sued
Curtis Publishing Company for publishing the article, “The Story of a College Football Fix.” 100
The article accused Butts of intentionally losing the football game between Georgia and the
University of Alabama (Alabama) while he was the head football coach at Georgia. 101 The article
told George Burnett’s102 story of how he heard Butts’ phone call with Alabama’s coach, Paul
Bryant. Based on Burnett’s account, an editor for Curtis Publishing Company reported that
Burnett overheard, “Butts outlin[e] Georgia’s offensive plays … and [he] told [Bryant] … how
Georgia planned to defend … Butts [also] mentioned both players and plays by name.” 103 The
article called Butts’ ethics as a coach into question.104 It concluded with the statement, “The
changes are that Wally Butts will never help any football team again . . . where it will end no one
so far can say. But careers will be ruined, that is for sure.”105 After Burnett reported what he
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100

Id. at 135.
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Id.
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heard to Georgia’s head coach, Butts resigned from his position at Georgia “for health and
business reasons.”106
Following publication of the article, Butts sued Curtis Publishing Company for punitive
damages in the amount of $5,000,000. 107 At the Georgia jury trial, Curtis Publishing Company
used the defense of truth. 108 The game in question was reviewed by experts and compared to the
alleged conversation between Butts and Bryant finding extreme contradictions between the
two.109 Consequently, the investigative journalism in the article was called into question. 110 The
jury trial found Curtis Publishing Company liable for defamation against Butts.111 The jury also
awarded punitive damages declaring there was “malice” —a requirement for punitive damages
under Georgia law.112 When this case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court held the New
York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard was inappropriate in this case because Butts was
not a public official. 113 As a result, they faced the decision of whether to hold Butts to the actual
malice standard.114

106

CLIFTON O. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL 49 (Howard Rusk Long 1981).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 135. It appeared Butts was employed by the State as athletic director and former
football coach of the University of Georgia, thus making him a public official. However, he was
actually employed by a private corporation, the Georgia Athletic Association, thus he was not a
public official. Id. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Rives dissented that
18

In his opinion, Justice Harlan declared the only way to find balance between libel actions
and free speech is to focus on the conduct element of the action. 115 In doing so, “officials could
prove that the publication involved was deliberately falsified, or published recklessly despite the
publisher’s awareness of probable falsity.” 116 Put simply, the conduct of the publisher and the
plaintiff were crucial in finding the balance between the tort action, the constitutional right of
free speech, and the standard at which the plaintiff should be held. It was out of this thought that
Harlan developed the “public figure” standard—a category in which he placed Butts.117
Harlan deemed Butts a public figure because he “commanded a substantial amount of
independent public interest at the time of the publication.” 118 While he was not a public official,
the topic on which the article was based was still of great interest to the public because of his
position as a coach and athletic director at Georgia.119 Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared a significant new rule of law stating that public figures, although not public officials,

New York Times v. Sullivan “was applicable because Butts was involved in activities of great
interest to the public.” Id. at 140.
114
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SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-12 (Keith Voelker,
4th ed. 2010). The court did not explicitly make the public figure standard precedent until Gertz.
Id. at 1-12–1-13. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 336 n.7).
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were still capable of recovering pecuniary damages in a defamation claim so long as they meet
the heightened standard of fault by proving actual malice.120
Aside from the fact that Butts was able to prove actual malice and win his defamation
claim, this case brought with it an even greater victory in the advancement of defamation
claims.121 By defining Butts as a “public figure” and not a “public official,” the U.S. Supreme
Court created a new category and heightened standard in which a plaintiff can be classified.122
The significance of this new category grants greater protection for speech under the First
Amendment by classifying the plaintiff as either a public official or public figure. 123 The
alternative would be to determine if the speech, itself, is of public concern. 124 This approach
would not grant the same degree of First Amendment protection.125
Simultaneous to the Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts case, the Court faced the issue
of determining whether Edwin A. Walker was a public figure in Associated Press v. Walker.126
Walker was a retired United States Army major general. His case arose out of a publication
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In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren discussed how he felt it unnecessary to
distinguish between a public official and a public figure—both should rise to the level of actual
malice without creating separate standards. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-11 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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discussing integration and riots at the University of Mississippi. 127 As an outspoken critic of
integration, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed Walker a public figure not simply because of his
position as seen in Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, but because he “thrust his personality
into the vortex of an important public controversy.” 128 Because Walker placed himself in a
conversation of public concern, he made himself a public figure and had to meet the actual
malice standard.129
3. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
In 1970, the conversation surrounding defamation law briefly shifted from classifying the
plaintiff in a defamation suit to classifying the speech itself. In a plurality opinion,130
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. introduced the idea of defamatory speech being privileged due
to the content being a “public issue.”131
In 1963, the Philadelphia Police Department’s Special Investigations Squad cracked
down on obscene magazines sold at newsstands. 132 Captain Ferguson of the police squad took it

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a plurality opinion is, “An opinion lacking enough
judges' votes to constitute a majority, but receiving more votes than any other opinion.” Opinion,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1266 (10th ed. 2014). This is significant to note because it shows the
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. decision was not unanimous. As a result, the “public issue”
holding does not carry the weight of a unanimous decision.
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upon himself to determine what material was or was not obscene. 133 On October 1, 1963, the
police arrested several newsstand operators who were allegedly selling obscene magazines.134
George Rosenbloom was among those arrested.135 Police also searched and seized magazines
and books in his warehouse.136 Rosenbloom was arrested twice surrounding the two incidents.137
Captain Ferguson reported to WIP, a local radio station, about Rosenbloom’s arrest.138
WIP delivered a segment entitled “City Cracks Down on Smut Merchants,” reporting
Rosenbloom possessed 3,000 obscene books.139 In the subsequent reports, WIP corrected
themselves and characterized the books as “reportedly obscene.”140 The broadcast also accused
Rosenbloom of having “smut literature” and of being one of the “girlie-book peddlers.”141

Id. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, obscenity is, “The quality, state, or condition of
being morally abhorrent or socially taboo, especially as a result of referring to or depicting
sexual or excretory functions. Something (such as an expression or act) that has this
characteristic.” Obscenity, BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 1245 (10th ed. 2014). Commercialized
obscenity is, “Obscenity produced and marketed for sale to the public.” Commercialized
Obscenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
133
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At trial, The Pennsylvania State Court acquitted Rosenbloom of the charges on the
grounds that the material was not actually obscene. 142 However, Rosenbloom was not done
fighting this battle. He sued WIP in Pennsylvania State Court, 143 claiming their description of
his books as “obscene” along with the language of “smut literature” and being a “girlie-book
peddle[r]” was defamatory, and harmed his reputation.144 Furthermore, Rosenbloom argued he
was a private person, and, as such, was unable to defend his reputation with the ease a public
official or public figure could.145 His arguments were denied any validity. 146
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices chose a different approach in
their decision by examining the alleged defamatory speech, itself. 147 In his opinion, Justice
Brennan held the priority must be given to the public’s interest in the speech and the event, not
the plaintiff’s “prior anonymity.”148 With this holding, Justice Brennan articulated citizens’ right
to communicate about what issues are occurring in their communities and the press’
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According to state law, Pennsylvania grants “absolute immunity for defamatory statements
made by high state officials, even if published with an improper motive, actual malice, or
knowing falsity.” Id. at 38. It also affords a conditional privilege to the press to report harmful
information so long as it is not published with the intent to defame that person, but instead to
inform the public. Id. Pennsylvania expects publications to occur with “reasonable care and
diligence to ascertain the truth,” and failure to do so may deem the immunity null and void. Id.
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constitutional right to publish those issues.149 As a result, a private person with a defamation
claim involving speech of public interest must meet the actual malice standard in order to
recover.150
4. Gertz v. Robert Welch
In 1973, almost ten years after New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court
further explained the meaning of a public figure and introduced another category of classifying a
defamation plaintiff increasing plaintiff classification to three categories—public official, public
figure and private person. 151
Elmer Gertz was the legal counsel to the Nelson family whose son was shot and killed by
a policeman named Nuccio.152 Following the conviction of Nuccio, the John Birch Society
created cross-country rhetoric “to discredit local law enforcement agencies and create in their
stead a national police force capable of supporting a Communist dictatorship.” 153 The John Birch
Society published their monthly newsletter, American Opinion, and declared Gertz “an architect
of the frame-up… an official to the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy… a Leninist and a

149

Id.

150

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-16
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010). Several justices, including Justice Harlan and Justice Marshall,
did not agree with Justice Brennan’s opinion. Id. at 1-1. To start, both justices felt a private
person need only prove strict liability in order to recover for the harm he endured. Both felt
Justice Brennan’s public interest standard left too much discretion to the court in determining
what was “newsworthy” on a case by case basis. Justice Marshall also believed Justice
Brennan’s public interest standard did not fully protect citizens from reputational harm, going
against basic rights of human dignity. Id. at 1-17.
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Communist-fronter.”154 Following the release of the article, Gertz sued the John Birch Society
for defamation.155
The U.S. Supreme Court aimed to determine Gertz’s burden of proof by declaring him
either a public official or public figure. 156 Interestingly, the Court found Gertz was neither. 157
This compelled the court to consider “whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes
defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure
may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those
statements.”158
To answer this question, the Court first explicitly defined public figures as people who
“occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes” and, “more commonly,” those who “have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies 159 in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”160 In
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Public controversy involves matters that “are legitimately a subject of public discussion or
debate rather than matters of mere curiosity.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-58 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010). In contrast, a private
controversy is one of private matters. That being said, if the media affords a private controversy
so much attention as to bring it to the forefront of public debate, it is still, itself, a private
controversy. Id. at 5-61.
159

160

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-33–
1-34 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010)). Although the U.S. Supreme
Court used public figure in Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, this is the first explicit
definition and use of the term. Id.
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doing so, the Court created a “limited-purpose” public figure. 161 These are people who, “By
propelling themselves into the “vortex” of public disputes, they, too, surrender some protection
for their reputation, but only insofar as the communication relates to their involvement in the
dispute.”162
Next, the Court explained the first remedy to a defamatory statement is to “minimize [the
statement’s] adverse impact on reputation.” 163 Because public officials and public figures have a
much greater degree of access to communication outlets and a greater ability to reach the masses,
they also have a greater ability to “minimize its adverse impact on reputation.” 164 This access
affords public officials and public figures greater protection from defamatory statements. 165 In
contrast, a private person has less access to communication channels, thus having less ability to
remedy the situation. 166 Consequently, private persons have a greater risk of injury when faced
with defamatory statements. 167
In a split decision, the Court declared Gertz a private person by looking at his total
involvement in the affair. The Court held that because Gertz was not involved in the criminal
case, did not discuss the civil case with a reporter, and did not “thrust himself into the vortex of

161
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this public issue,” his basic involvement as the Nelsons’ legal counsel was not enough to deem
him a public figure.168 Gertz was, thus, not required to prove The John Birch Society acted with
actual malice.169 Since the ruling, in Gertz, states are not required to hold private plaintiffs to the
actual malice standard in defamation claims filed by private persons.170
C. Defamation, Non-Media Defendants, and Private Concerns
In 1985, The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a case that dealt with determining the
standard for a non-media defendant accused of defamation regarding a private matter in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders.171
The U.S. Supreme Court compared this case to Gertz v. Welch.177 Because the court was
split in Gertz, the U.S. Supreme Court was then and still is hesitant in deciding whether the Gertz
standard is applicable to non-media defendants.178 Some states explicitly stated the Gertz
standard is only to be applied to “institutional media” when dealing with private plaintiffs.179
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Similarly, other states have not allowed plaintiffs to bring in private defendants. 180 This means,
plaintiffs are also limited to bring a claim against “institutional media” only. 181 Unlike the
defendant in Gertz, the defendant in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. was not a media company. 182 The
Court was sensitive in recognizing the difficulty that often arises in distinguishing between
media and non-media defendants.183 However, the Court stated that a credit report agency is
distinctly a non-media entity.184 Justice Powell, in his Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. opinion, explained
the alleged defamatory speech was not a public issue185 and did not fall within the scope of the
media protections of the Gertz actual malice standard.186
Additionally, the Court provided three significant principals with their ruling in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc.187
First, it removed vast amounts of speech from the full protection of Gertz . . . .
Second, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion put courts back into the business of
judging, on a case-by-case basis, what is of legitimate public concern . . . . Third,
Dun & Bradstreet left courts without guidance as to how to make the
180
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determination of what was and what was not a matter of legitimate pubic
concern.188
Justice Powell explained that the First Amendment is more concerned with protecting public
matters as opposed to private ones.189 While there are still protections surrounding private
matters and the ability to publish them, First Amendment protection is “less stringent” where
they are concerned. 190

188

Id. at 1-22–1-23.

189
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
“Congress shall make no law…prohibiting…the freedom of speech, or of the press.”199
A. The First Amendment and Free Speech Theory
Every democracy protects speech but the United States provides the highest degree of
protection.200 The First Amendment establishes the Constitutional right to freedom of speech, the
press, religion, and expression. 201 This protection is afforded at varying levels depending on the
societal value of the speech.202
All branches of government are prohibited from restricting free speech and restricting the
press.203 They are, however, allowed to regulate speech.204 This occurs through the balancing of
constitutional values and regulatory interests.205 There are several situations in which speech is
not protected. For example, speech is not protected when
(1) [e]xpression has slight, if any social value;
(2) [When the speech] [p]resents a direct, imminent, and probable danger of
inciting unlawful conduct;
(3) [When the speech] [d]efames a private person at least negligently and a public
official or figure with actual malice
(4) [When the speech] [i]nvades privacy in an unacceptable way;
(5) [When the speech] [a]dvertises a good or service that is illegal, or does so
falsely or deceptively;
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(6) [When the speech] [r]epresents a commercial speech that is outweighed by a
substantial state interest and governed by regulation that is narrowly tailored
to achieve its objective; and
(7) [When the speech] [i]s sexually explicit (albeit not obscene) and readily
available to children. 206
This type of speech is thought to be outside the scope of the First Amendment’s protection and,
thus, falls into the category of “unprotected” speech. 207 Unprotected speech includes libel,
obscenity, and fighting words. 208
Several cases before the U.S. Supreme Court required the application of the First
Amendment to the law on defamation. This jurisprudence developed a roadmap to understanding
the application of the First Amendment and how it protects speech and the press. Cases such as
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Curtis v. Butts, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., and Gertz v.
Robert Welch bridged the gap between the First Amendment and its actual application in
defamation suits. Many questions remain unanswered as to how the justices reached their
conclusions and why they applied the First Amendment in such a manner. Consequently, several
theories emerged in an effort to create a foundation for First Amendment application.209
However, as Thomas Emerson said, “The outstanding fact about the First Amendment today is
that the Supreme Court has never developed any comprehensive theory of what that
constitutional guarantee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases.” 210
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The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to proclaim a prevailing theory of the First
Amendment.211 The many attempts to answer the “why questions” of the First Amendment are
referred to as “free speech theory.” 212 Under this theory, the “why questions” are significant
because understanding “why the First Amendment exists will tend to influence heavily one’s
views on what it means and how it should be implemented.”213 Of the theories that emerged from
free speech theory, the ones that weigh in heavily for the purpose of this thesis are the
marketplace of ideas, the checking value, and the watchdog theory.
B. The Marketplace of Ideas and Its Influence on Defamation
The “marketplace of ideas” theory was created through a combination of works by John
Milton and John Stuart Mill. 214 In Areopagitica,215 John Milton stressed that in the realm of
public conversation and one’s ability to speak freely, truth would always be victorious in the
battle against false speech. 216 Building on Milton’s philosophy, John Stuart Mill, was passionate
about writing on the dangers of suppressing public opinion even if the public opinion was
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wrong.217 Mill’s philosophy supported unorthodox speech, explaining that what appears to be
unorthodox at first can later evolve into the norm. 218 Mill’s publication was intended to promote
the idea that “self protection is the only legitimate reason to interfere with another person’s
liberty.”219 By combining both Milton and Mill’s beliefs, the marketplace of ideas theory was
born and became a cornerstone of First Amendment theory.220
The marketplace of ideas is a theory that indicates in order to “test the truth or acceptance
of ideas” those ideas must be free to compete in an “open market.” 221 Under this theory, leaving
the ability to ascertain the truth to the will of the government or authoritative censorship does not
ensure truth will prevail.222 The theory, itself, focuses more on the process of ascertaining the
truth rather than ensuring everything said is truthful.223 In other words, “the marketplace of ideas
focuses on the “truth-seeking function.”224
Since the goal of the First Amendment is to ensure free speech and expression, the
marketplace of ideas provides a vehicle in which to accomplish that. 225 This theory is a metaphor
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for the economic marketplace. 226 For example, in an economic marketplace, the better the
product, the stronger the likelihood of surviving the marketplace competition. 227 Similarly, in
the marketplace of ideas, the better the idea the more likely it is to survive competition and is,
thus, accepted as truth.228
Several Supreme Court Justices and scholars latched on to this theory. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Justice Louis Brandeis publicly solidified this theory with their support.229
Justice Brandeis even wrote, “Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” 230 Put simply, the marketplace of
ideas theory protects all ideas and citizens’ ability to freely express those ideas in an effort to
prevent authoritative institutions from censoring truth. 231
The marketplace of ideas influenced scholars including C. Edwin Baker and Thomas
Scanlon.232 In 1972, Thomas Scanlon developed the “Millian principle” in which he outlined two
types of harms that prove the negative effect of regulating citizens’ speech.233 These two harms
are
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(a) harms to certain individuals which consist in their coming to have false beliefs as a
result of those acts of expression; (b) harmful consequences of acts performed as a result
of those acts of expression, where the connection between the acts of expression and the
subsequent harmful acts consist merely in the fact that the act of expression left the
agents to believe (or increased their tendency to believe) these acts to be worth
performing.234
Consequently, Scanlon advocated for a government that could maintain authority over its
citizens while affording them the freedom of expression. 235
Similarly, in his 1977 article, “Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,” Baker
presented his “liberty model” based on the marketplace of ideas. 236 With “self fulfillment and
and individual participation in change” at the center of the model, Baker felt citizens should have
complete control over their expression.237 Specifically, citizens should be free from
“governmental or societal restrictions that limit individual autonomy.” 238 However, Baker relied
on Mills’ rationale that the only time “power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community” is when that member’s speech may harm others.239 Anything else,
according to Baker, is a violation of the social contract. 240
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1. New York Times v. Sullivan
The marketplace of ideas theory was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court and applied in
their jurisprudence involving defamation claims. This is particularly true for the ruling in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan. In this case, Justice Brennan explicitly expressed his concern for
keeping public issues available as topics for wide-open debate.241 Applying the marketplace of
ideas premise that truth will prevail through open conversation, Justice Brennan also indicated
that citizens should be allowed to discuss public officials and public matters even if those
conversations led to unpleasant thoughts and reactions. 242 It was this way of thinking that led the
Court to afford greater protection to speech. 243 Specifically, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
the Court allotted greater protection to The New York Times, the publishing entity, by requiring
Sullivan to prove the defamatory language was made with actual malice. 244 This heightened
standard was a result of the court broadening the scope of the First Amendment to protect the
press.245

narratives, holidays, myths, heroes, symbols, and sacred places, as well as their empowering and
galvanizing images, slogans, and principles-have become the cement of modern societies. They
function to preserve “community” alongside “society.” ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 2, at 292 (John R. Vile et al. eds., 2009).
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In his 2015 article, “The Promises of New York Times v. Sullivan,” David A. Anderson
explains the effects of the New York Times v. Sullivan ruling.246 Such effects are a result of the
application of the marketplace of ideas theory. Anderson explains that the Court feared that
limiting open debate would create a chilling effect on public conversation and public issues in an
effort to avoid the accusation of defaming another’s character. 247 This idea of creating an open
atmosphere for public conversation is a direct application of the marketplace of ideas.248 The
ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan provided the freedom to not only have the ability to
“speak one’s mind, but also the freedom to be informed about public issues.”249 This is a direct
reflection of the value of the marketplace of ideas to let all ideas, thoughts, and speech be free in
the marketplace and allow the truth to prevail.
Anderson explained how the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan expansion of the First
Amendment also expanded the marketplace of ideas theory.250 While the marketplace of ideas
protects only ideas, Anderson believes New York Times Co. v. Sullivan extended protection to
ideas and information.251 Just as the marketplace of ideas theory recognizes a threat of
authoritative censorship of ideas, Anderson believes the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Court
“invoked Madison’s assertion that “the censorial power is in the people over the Government,
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and not in the Government over the people.”252 Plainly put, Anderson believes New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan supports the people’s voice, and their protection of speech, even in defamation
cases, over that of government censorship. 253
2. Gertz v. Robert Welch
Critics of the marketplace of ideas believe this theory is subject to the same pitfalls the
economic marketplace succumbs to.254 Just as the rich have greater access to and an increased
level of participation in the economic marketplace, so to do they have the same increased access
to and participation in the marketplace of ideas.255 This is a direct parallel to the rationale the
Court used in Gertz v. Welch.
Applying the marketplace of ideas theory, the ruling in Gertz distinguished public figures
from private persons. The Court explained the first remedy to a defamatory statement is to
“minimize [the statement’s] adverse impact on reputation.” 256 Because public officials and public
figures have a much greater degree of access to communication outlets and a greater ability to
reach the masses, they also have a greater ability to “minimize its adverse impact on
reputation.”257 This access affords public officials and public figures greater protection from
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defamatory statements.258 In contrast, a private person has less access to communication
channels, thus having less ability to remedy the situation. 259 Consequently, private persons have
a greater risk of injury when faced with defamatory statements. 260
Because of Gertz v. Welch, states are now allowed to dismiss private plaintiffs from
meeting the actual malice standard. 261 The plaintiff’s burden of proof depends on the state in
which litigation occurs because different states apply different standards.262 According to Ruth
Walden and Derigan Silver, “The best hope right now for reducing this confusion and ensuring
that an appropriate balance is struck between protection of individual reputation and freedom of
expression may be for the states to do it themselves.” 263 Thirty-six states, including Louisiana, as
well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico adopted negligence as the burden of proof for a
private person claiming defamation. 264 States that do not use negligence as their plaintiff’s
standard found a middle ground somewhere between negligence and actual malice.265
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3. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
In “Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence” by Robert Post,
the author draws particular distinction to a significant shortfall of the Court.266 The U.S. Supreme
Court fails to bridge the gap between the marketplace of ideas and the First Amendment when
their opinions do not explicitly explain that the truth-seeking function is concerned with social
ideas.267 To say the marketplace of ideas believes the First Amendment protects all speech is
inaccurate.268 The theory aims to protect speech “that communicates ideas and that is embedded
in the kinds of social practices that produce truth.” 269 Additionally, jurisprudence proves states
do not allow abusive speech. The U.S. Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection to
speech that is “outrageous,”270 “offensive,”271 “exaggerated,” “vilified,”272 “indecent,”273 hurts
one’s “dignity,”274 or facilitates “aggression275 and “personal assault.”276 This is particularly
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relevant to defamation law in that one simply cannot make any statement one wants, especially if
the statement is false and one makes it negligently or knowingly with reckless disregard for the
truth.277
This application of the marketplace of ideas is apparent in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. when the Court looked at the questionable speech, itself, to determine if it rose to the level
of defamation.278 In his opinion, Justice Brennan held
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense
the individual did not “voluntarily” choose to become involved. The Public’s
primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the
participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety. 279
With this statement, Justice Brennan articulated citizens’ right to know what issues are occurring
in their communities and the press’ constitutional right to report on those issues. 280 He wrote:
We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied
in the First Amendment by extending constitutional protection to all discussions
and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without
regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.” 281
The Court feared placing too many restrictions on speech and the press would cause a
chilling effect on public conversation and the press. 282 As a result, a private person with a
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defamation claim involving speech of public interest must meet the actual malice standard in
order to recover.283 This result was a significant shift from focusing on whether the plaintiff was
a public official, public figure, or private person to whether the issue was one of public
concern.284
C. Protection of Publications Through First Amendment Theory
Other theories that have contributed to First Amendment theory are the watchdog theory
and the checking value theory. These theories grant greater protection to publications and are
directly applicable to the law on defamation.
1. The Watchdog Theory
In 1974, Justice Potter Stewart addressed the watchdog theory in “Or of the Press.” 285
This publication surfaced shortly after President Richard Nixon resigned from office following
the Watergate scandal and brought with it a new theory surrounding the First Amendment. 286
Justice Stewart examined the language of the First Amendment which states, 287
“Congress shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
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speech, or of the press.”288 He found a great deal of importance in the First Amendment language
“or of the press.”289 Taking into account fifty years of First Amendment jurisprudence, Justice
Stewart noticed the focus was on guaranteeing individuals’ rights to free speech. 290
Justice Stewart recognized a distinction between guaranteeing the free speech rights of
individuals and the rights of “the press.”291 He criticized the previous jurisprudence for failing to
consider the “Constitution’s guarantee of a Free Press.”292 While the Court focused on individual
rights guaranteed by the constitution, it failed to account for the rights of an institution. Justice
Stewart believed the “or of the press” clause was a Constitutional protection granted to the
institution of the press.
Justice Stewart explained how freedom of the press and freedom of expression are not
synonymous.293 Because the founders distinguished between granting freedom of expression and
freedom of the press in the language of the First Amendment, Justice Stewart believed they had
two different meanings.294 In fact, Justice Stewart explained how freedom of the press extended
beyond the freedom of expression that is guaranteed to all citizens under the First
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Amendment.295 Freedom of the press allows the institution of the press to “serve as a neutral
forum for debate, a “market place for ideas.” 296 Further, he believed the press was created to
serve as the “fourth institution” of the Government— to serve as a watchdog for the other three
branches of Government; the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. 297 In the words of John
Adams, “The liberty of the press is essential to the security of the state.” 298 As a result, the press
is “the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.” 299
2. The Checking Value
In 1977, Professor Vincent Blasi of the University of Michigan published “The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory.”300 He maintained “that free expression has value in part
because of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official power.”301
The checking value holds that abuse of power by public officials is a far greater abuse
than that by private individuals. 302 Blasi believed that public officials’ abuse of power had a
greater impact on government and, in turn, on individual citizens.303 Furthermore, public officials
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have more power to check on private persons, creating a one-way flow of information.304 The
checking value allows the press to “check” public officials and reduce government
misconduct.305 The checking value assumes public officials will conduct their business in a more
fair manner because their actions are reported by the press.306 Blasi was adamant in explaining
that the checking value was meant to supplement other First Amendment theories, not replace
them.307
3. Effect on the Law on Defamation
The landmark Supreme Court rulings of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,308 Curtis v.
Butts,309 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc,310 and Gertz v. Welch,311 occurred prior to the
development of the checking value312 and watchdog313 theories. Nonetheless, it is clear the
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foundations for the theories were greatly influenced by the preceding Court rulings.
Consequently, the theories are directly related to the law on defamation.
For example, Justice Stewart’s conception of First Amendment protection for the press
relied on the actual malice standard asserted by the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, Curtis
Publishing Company v. Butts, and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 314 Justice Stewart explained
how this group of cases forced the U.S. Supreme Court to take a step away from the free speech
rights of individuals, and examine the free speech rights of the press.315 Examining the “limits
imposed by the free press guarantee upon a state’s common or statutory law of libel,” the Court
declared a public figure must prove actual malice on behalf of the publisher to succeed in a
defamation suit.316 The rulings in these landmark cases were a direct influence on the watchdog
theory. The expanded protection afforded to the press by the Court was adopted by Stewart in his
theory of affording institution-wide First Amendment protection to the publishing industry.317
Additionally, Blasi suggests that the whole premise of punishing those for defamation is
directly related to the checking value. 318 Historically, defamation was a tactic “used by tyrants to
silence potentially influential critics.” 319 The First Amendment protects speech against public
officials because “some form of systematic scrutiny of officials seems necessary in light of the
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tyrannical possibilities opened up by the pervasiveness of technological resources of modern
government.”320 Blasi associates the checking value with this line of thought.321 Checking public
officials to ensure they steer clear of government misconduct offers potential for suppressing
tyrannical behavior.
Maintaining actual malice as the standard to recover punitive damage awards against a
public official or public figure supports the Court’s concern with granting excessive damage
awards in a defamation case. 322 The Gertz v. Welch ruling states, “the doctrine of presumed
damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for
injury sustained by the publication of a false fact.” 323 Consequently, the Court struggled with
balancing the need to keep excessive damage awards in check while still compensating the
injured party.324 Blasi suggested the checking value could eliminate this battle. By applying the
checking value toward the public official, the Court can develop a better rationale when deciding
the degree to which courts must limit damage awards in a defamation suit.325 Blasi believes “the
checking value is concerned not with the general process of selecting the best person for office
but with the narrower task of preventing abuses of the public trust.” 326
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Professor Blasi acknowledges the limited use of the checking value by the Supreme
Court. He believes that applying the theory “would improve the process of doctrinal
formulation” for the First Amendment. 327 The more informed the public is, the less likely a
public official is to misbehave, and the less likely a defamatory claim will arise. While the
checking value centers around public officials and this thesis focuses on athletes (not public
officials), it is still useful in developing answers to the questions at hand.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS
RQ 1: Can a NCAA collegiate athlete bring a defamation claim against a media entity as the
defendant?
RQ 2: If a NCAA collegiate athlete were to bring a defamation claim against a media entity, how
would the court classify the collegiate athlete — as a private person or a public figure?
RQ 3: Can a NCAA collegiate athlete bring a defamation claim against a non-media entity as the
defendant? For example, if a non-media Twitter user publishes a defamatory tweet, can the
collegiate athlete sue that user for their online publication?
RQ 4: What burden of proof would the NCAA collegiate athlete have to meet to prove
defamation on the part of the defendant — negligence or actual malice?
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS
This thesis relied on landmark defamation cases from the U.S. Supreme Court — New
York Times v. Sullivan, Curtis v. Butts, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., and Gertz v. Robert
Welch. Within the realm of legal research, the law, itself, is considered a primary source. 328
Primary sources are afforded greater weight by the courts because they are considered “the actual
source of the law.”329
The cases were gathered using LexisNexis. LexisNexis is a legal research database. 330
LexisNexis is one of the most popular legal research databases.331 For the purpose of this thesis,
LexisNexis was used to identify and sift through court rulings by appellate and trial courts in the
fifty states, the District of Columbia, and federal courts.
The searches were performed using boolean keyword searches. Boolean searches use
“boolean logic,” a “mathematical formula…[that can] “read” specific words and symbols (called
“operators”) to help narrow our searches.” 332 The keyword searches used by this author in the
database consisted of:
“defamation” + “supreme court”
“defamation” + “first amendment”
“defamation” + “public figure”
“defamation” + “public official”
“defamation” + “private person”
328

STEPHEN ELIAS, LEGAL RESEARCH: HOW TO FIND & UNDERSTAND THE LAW 23 (Janet
Portman, 15th ed. 2009).
329

Id.
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LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/about-us/about-us.page (last visited Oct. 27,
2016).
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STEPHEN ELIAS, LEGAL RESEARCH: HOW TO FIND & UNDERSTAND THE LAW 41 (Janet
Portman, 15th ed. 2009).
332

Id. at 31.
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“defamation” + “athlete”
Those rulings were read to determine how the applied categories initially developed in
precedent-setting rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, which is considered the highest court in the
land.333
The U.S. Supreme Court cases that this thesis cites as setting precedents – New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, Curtis v. Butts, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., and Gertz v. Robert
Welch – created the foundation for defamation law surrounding the First Amendment.335 In these
landmark cases, the Court created categories in which to place the defamation plaintiff to classify
them as either a public official, public figure, or private person. 336 Additionally, the cases
provide the standard the plaintiff must meet, depending on their classification, in order to recover
damages from a defamatory statement.337 The requirements outlined by the Court in these cases
and subsequent citing cases will guide the conversation in determining into which category a
student-athlete falls and what would be the appropriate level of fault if a student-athlete were to
bring a defamation claim.
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Id. at 182. Precedent means, once the U.S. Supreme Court makes a decision on a question of
law, subsequent cases with the same question of law are to be decided in the same manner. Id.
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See, ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 12–1-25 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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See, Id. at 1-4; Id. at 1-10; Id. at 1-17.
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See, Id. at 1-4; Id. at 1-10; Id. at 1-17.
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS
“Defining a public figure is like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.” 338
With an in-depth understanding of the cornerstone U.S. Supreme Court cases on
defamation as well as the underlying communications theories, one can begin to answer the
questions surrounding defamation and how it pertains to NCAA student-athletes.
A. NCAA Student-Athletes and Their Ability to Bring a Defamation Claim
The short answer to the inquiry of whether a NCAA collegiate athlete can bring a
defamation claim against a media entity is “yes.” Under the U.S. Constitution Article IV, section
2, paragraph 1, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states.” 339 In other words, a basic right of all citizens is the right to bring
suit in a court of law. 340 Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. expanded upon this paragraph when
it explained
In an organized society [the right to sue] is the right conservative of all other
rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest
and most essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each State to
the citizens of all other States to the precise extent that it is allowed to its own
citizens.341
Just because a citizen can sue, however, does not necessarily mean the action is warranted nor
does it guarantee success. In order for any plaintiff to assert a defamation claim–whether the
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Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F.Supp 440, 443 (1976).
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 1.
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Chambers v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 28 S. Ct. 34 (1907).
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Id.
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plaintiff be a NCAA student-athlete or a typical citizen–the plaintiff must prove the prima facie
case of defamation.
1. The Prima Facie Case
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a prime facie case is, “A party's production of
enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor.” 342
Put plainly, the party must meet the elements of defamation to determine if there is warranted
opportunity to recover for the alleged defamatory statement.
The first element of the prima facie case is that the plaintiff must prove the statement was
published.343 “Published” means “to distribute copies (of a work) to the public. To communicate
(defamatory words) to someone other than the person defamed.” 344 Further, the publication must
be done in a manner that is accessible to a third party.345 The plaintiff must also prove the
statement “cause[s] damage to someone’s good name or reputation.” 346
Next, the statement must be false in order for it to be defamatory. 347 Historically, the
defendant was responsible for proving falsity. 348 The U.S. Supreme Court first examined falsity
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Prima Facie, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (10th ed. 2014).
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Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: the Case of Failed Reporting and
an NFL Drug Test, 33 SPORTS LAW. J. 51, 52 (1996) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (5th Ed. 1984)).
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Publish, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (10th ed. 2014).

345

Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: the Case of Failed Reporting and
an NFL Drug Test, 33 SPORTS LAW. J. 51, 52 (1996).
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ROBERT TRAGER ET. AL, THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION 173 (5th ed.
2016).
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and issues of public concern in Philadelphia Newspaper v. Hepps and Snyder v. Phelps. In
Philadelphia Newspaper v. Hepps, the burden shifted from the original stance of the defendant
proving falsity to the plaintiff proving falsity when it involves an issue of public concern. 349
However, since the Court first examined falsity in Philadelphia Newspaper v. Hepps, the burden
has shifted to the plaintiff proving falsity in a defamation suit.350
a. Defamation, Matters of Public Concern, and Falsity
The seminal case for falsity as it pertains to issues of public concern is Philadelphia
Newspaper v. Hepps. 351 In this case, Maurice S. Hepps and General Programming, Inc. (GPI)
sued the Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. for defamation.352 GPI was a corporation that franchised
convenient stores named “Thrifty.” 353 Hepps was a principal stockholder in GPI.
Between May 1975 and May 1976, the Philadelphia Inquirer–owned by GPI–published
five articles accusing Hepps and GPI of having ties to Mafia figures. 354 The Philadelphia
Inquirer further accused Hepps and GPI of using those ties to influence legislative and
administrative processes within Pennsylvania’s government. 355 Specifically, the articles stated a
state legislator was “a Pittsburgh Democrat and convicted felon…[who exemplified] a clear
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Phila. Newspaper v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
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2016).
351
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pattern of interference in state government by [the legislator] on behalf of Hepps and Thrifty.” 356
The articles also stated Thrifty “won a series of competitive advantages through rulings by the
State Liquor Control Board,” launching an investigation “between the Thrifty chain and known
mafia figures.”357
The U.S. Supreme Court provided two factors to determine a defamation case. 358 The
first was whether the plaintiff was a public official, public figure or a private person. 359 The
second was whether the alleged defamatory speech was a matter of public concern. 360
The Court declared matters of public concern demand greater constitutional protection to
inform and protect the public. 361 For example, allegations of criminal activity are matters of
public concern. New York Times v. Sullivan only required a public official know falsity in order
to recover in a defamation suit on matters of public concern. 362 However, Phildelphia Newspaper
v. Hepps expanded upon this, requiring a private person plaintiff also show the alleged
defamatory statement as false when it is a matter of public concern. 363 In this case, Hepps was a
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private person, but allegations of criminal activity are a matter of public concern. 364 Therefore,
Hepps had to prove the statements made by the Philadelphia Inquirer were false.365
The Court implemented this standard of law to prevent a chilling effect. 366 Falsity is a
required element because “to do otherwise could only result in a deterrence of speech which the
Constitution makes free.”367 The Court understands that circumstances vary, preventing the
demonstration of the falsity of some defamatory statements, but this is a downfall the Court is
willing to overlook in order to protect the First Amendment. 368 Consequently, greater First
Amendment protection is granted to matters of public concern.369
Another relevant notable case is Snyder v. Phelps. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly defined “issue of public concern” following the picketing demonstration by Westboro
Baptist Church (Westboro) near Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder’s funeral. 370
Killed in action, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder’s funeral was to be held at a
Catholic Church in Westminster, Maryland. 371 Ater the funeral arrangement was published in the
local newspaper, five members from Westboro decided to picket the memorial service “on public
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Id. at 777.
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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Id. at 448.
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land adjacent to public streets near the Maryland State House, the United States Naval Academy,
and Matthew Snyder’s funeral.” 372 Westboro held signs that said “God Hates the USA/Thank
God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed, “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank
God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “God Hates Fags,” “You’re Going
to Hell,” and “God Hates you.”373 Their picketing was seen by the passing funeral procession
and aired on the local news station. 374
Following the funeral, Matthew Snyder’s father, Albert Snyder (Snyder) sued Westboro
for defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. 375 Snyder won on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim receiving over $2 million in punitive damages. 376
Appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, the verdict was reversed in favor of Westboro. 377
The Court declared “Westboro’s statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because
those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed
solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.”378
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Id. at 449.
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Id. at 450. Note, in this case, the District Court awarded Phelps’ summary judgment on the
defamation claim. However, the U.S. Supreme Court only addressed the intentional infliction of
emotional distress and intrusion and civil conspiracy. Nonetheless, the definition of public
concern is relevant to First Amendment protection in defamation claims. Id.
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The justices also used this case as an opportunity to define what constitutes an issue of
public concern.379 Quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court said “speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”380 As such, speech of
public concern warrants greater First Amendment protection. 381 The Court said
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can “be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or
when it “is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public.”382
In contrast, a matter of private concern, as seen in Dun & Bradstreet does not demand the
same level of constitutional protection. 383 Speech of private matters does not have the same
degree of First Amendment protection as speech of public concern “because restricting speech
on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech
on matters of public interest.”384
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Id. at 451–452.
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Id. at 452. Note, Garrison v. Louisiana was a criminal defense case in which Robert Paul
Garrison attempted to quash a DWI offense on the grounds that “Officer Sasser had no
jurisdiction off campus and even if he did, he did not have a reasonable basis to stop defendant.”
State v. Garrison 911 So.2d 346, 348 (2005). The Court held, “The law permits police to seek
the voluntary cooperation of the public in the investigation of a possible crime. An officer does
not violate the prohibition against unlawful seizures by requesting that an individual give
information or cooperation in the investigation or prevention of a crime. Such voluntary inquiries
are vital in police investigatory work.” State v. Garrison 911 So.2d 346, 349 (2005).
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Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 708 (1983)).
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(1983)).
383

Id. at 453.

384

Id. at 451–452.

58

The Court ruled in favor of Westboro because issues surrounding the state of the United
States, the military, homosexuality, and scandals of religion are, in fact, matters of public
concern.385 Consequently, discussion of such issues deserves greater First Amendment
protection.386
Issues of public concern encompass a broad area of speech. As it pertains to the questions
at hand regarding NCAA student-athletes and defamation, it is important to classify speech as
addressing matters of public or private concern because each situation involving a student-athlete
will vary in fact. Some instances may examine alleged defamatory statements that have no
connection to athletes or their performance in any way. However, the statement in question may
still rise to the level of being an issue of public concern. In other words, the language may not
pertain to the student-athlete’s performance on the playing field but may still be items that are
newsworthy. For example, if the statement pertains to an athlete and criminal activity, it is likely
a matter of public concern.387
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Id. at 454.

386

Id. at 458.
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See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 776 (finding that newspaper articles
addressing allegations of criminal conduct by private figures were matters of public concern). In
“Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: the Case of Failed Reporting and an NFL Drug Test,”
author Stephen G. Strauss compared Holt v. Cox Enterprise to a situation surrounding former
University of Miami football player, James Stewart, and his battle with the New York Times to
determine if off-the-field conduct is actionable in a defamation claim. Stephen G. Strauss,
Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: The Case of Failed Reporting and an NFL Drug Test, 33
SPORTS LAW. J. 51, 56 (1996). Strauss believed Stewart’s case is distinguishable from Holt v.
Cox Enterprise in that the alleged defamatory statement did not concern Stewart’s activity on the
field. Strauss believes Stewart can argue that although he is a public figure due to his presence
and activity on a high profile collegiate football team (Stewart actively worked to be a starter on
Alabama’s football team), the drug test at the center of the alleged defamatory statement falls
within a private realm of his life. Id. at 58. However, a drug test does still relate to whether an
athlete can play. Further, illegal drug use is a crime. Strauss does not address this fact, but,
instead, considers a drug test to be something private. Id.
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Exclusive to the above elements of defamation is the additional element of actual
malice.388 Actual malice is a further requirement that must be met if the plaintiff is deemed a
public figure or public official.389 Actual malice was established in New York Times v.
Sullivan.390 The Court defined actual malice as “publication with knowledge that the offending
statement is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” 391 If the plaintiff is
deemed a private person, the plaintiff need only prove the statement was made with
negligence.392
b. The Big Picture
Synthesizing, in order for a NCAA student-athlete to bring a defamation claim, the
student-athlete must:
i.
ii.

Prove the alleged defamatory statement was published in a manner
accessible to a third party393
Prove the alleged defamatory statement “cause[s] damage to someone’s
good name or reputation.”394
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ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-25
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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Id. at 1-26–1-27.
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Id. at 1-13.
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Id. at 1-25. Note, whether the NCAA student-athlete would be deemed a public or private
figure is addressed subsequently in this publication.
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A plaintiff considered a private person by the court in a defamation case is to adopt the
burden of proof set forth by that particular state “so long as it does not provide for liability
without ‘fault.’” Id. at 6-2 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347). Thirty-six states, including
Louisiana, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico adopted negligence as the burden of proof
for a private person claiming defamation. Id. at 6-3–6-5.
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Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: the Case of Failed Reporting and
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iii.
iv.

Prove the alleged defamatory statement is false if it involves a matter of
public concern395
Prove the defendant’s negligence or actual malice in making the
statement.396

If the student-athlete meets the above elements, it is likely the athlete has a viable claim to bring
against the defendant. 397 Nonetheless, no case law was found pertaining to defamation of a
current student-athlete.
2. Holt and the College Athlete Case
While no case law was found in which a current NCAA student-athlete brought a
defamation claim against a media-entity or similar defendant, there is, however, litigation in
which a former NCAA student-athlete sued for defamation after completion of his collegiate
career.398
Holt v. Cox Enterprise provides the closest example of a defamation case brought by a
NCAA student-athlete.399 In November of 1961, the University of Alabama (“Alabama”) and
Georgia Tech competed in a “highly publicized football game.” 400 In the fourth quarter,
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ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-7 (Keith
Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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Note, the standard is determined by whether the plaintiff is considered a public figure or
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Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 408.
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Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 409.
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Alabama’s Darwin Holt hit Georgia Tech’s Chick Graning. 401 Graning suffered several
injuries.402 When officials did not call a penalty against Holt, a national conversation about the
hit began.403 Although Holt, did not comment on the issue at the time, many journalists published
articles on the incident. 404
Years later, Holt participated in an interview with The Tuscaloosa News resulting in a
series of five articles published in the Sunday Atlanta Journal and Constitution.405 The articles
revisited the famous hit.406
Over 20 years after the initial hit, Holt sued Cox Enterprises, Inc., for libel407 and
invasion of privacy. 408 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found the
published statements about Holt referred to his experience as a college athlete and injured his
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Id. at 410.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. Holt did not publically comment on the hit at the time but did so prior to bringing suit in
1984 claiming the hit was, in fact, legal.
405

Id. The articles were written by Darrell Simmons, defendant to the action. The fact that Holt
commented on the incident is a significant element in determining if Holt is a public figure or
private person under defamation law. Following Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., whether the
plaintiff “thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence others” was a
significant element in determining if the plaintiff was a public figure or private person for
purposes of a defamation claim.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER,
AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-35 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. 345
(1974).
406

Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 411.

Libel is “written or visual defamation.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL,
SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-10 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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reputation to the degree of rising to defamation. 409 The court deemed Holt a limited-purpose
public figure:410
As a member of the Alabama football team, Holt voluntarily played that sport
before thousands of persons---spectators and sportswriters alike---and he
necessarily assumed the risk that these persons would comment on the manner in
which he performed. The defamatory comments in the articles relate solely to
Holt's play on the field and are thus within the limited range of issues upon which
Holt invited comment. 411
Finding he was a limited-purpose public figure escalated the plaintiff’s burden of proof to that of
proving “actual malice.”412 This standard provided more protection to the media against being

409

Id. at 411.
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In a defamation case, the court will consider the plaintiff either a public figure or a private
person. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the court defined a public figure as, “those who “occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes” and, “more commonly,” and a limited-purpose public figure as those who “have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS 1-33–1-34 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
New York Times v. Sullivan declared public officials must prove actual malice in order to meet
their burden of proof in defamation cases. Id. at 1-36 (citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285–
286). Actual malice was established in New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 1-13. The Court
defined actual malice as, “publication with knowledge that the offending statement is false or
with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” Id. at 1-25 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan 376 U.S. 254). In contrast, a plaintiff considered a private person by the court in a
defamation case is to adopt the burden of proof set forth by that particular state “so long as it
does not provide for liability without ‘fault.’” Id. at 6-2 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418
U.S. 323, 347 (1974)). Thirty-six states, including Louisiana, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico adopted negligence as the burden of proof for a private person claiming defamation.
Id. at 6-3–6-5.
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Id. at 412-13. See also ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
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held liable for harming the reputation of public figures on a matter of public concern. 413 Unable
to prove actual malice, Holt did not recover damages.414
Relevant to the question at hand, Holt is an example of a collegiate athlete bringing a
defamation claim. Because Holt was a student-athlete and brought the defamation claim
surrounding his actions as a student-athlete, this case supports the notion that a student-athlete
can bring a defamation claim against a media entity. However, something the student-athlete
should be cognizant of is the statute of limitations for defamation claims within one to three
years of publication of the defamatory statement.415
If the athlete does not bring the defamation claim within one to three years, depending on
the specific jurisdictional rules, the athlete is barred from ever bringing the claim. Holt was able
413

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-30–
1-31 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254).The justices
understood the difficulty in a journalist’s job of trying to report to the public while still trying to
quote speakers verbatim. Id. “So long as the gist of a quotation is correct, errors that do not
materially change the meaning of the statement do no constitute “actual malice” even when they
are made deliberately.” Id.
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Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 413.
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Most states have a one to two year statute of limitations period. ROBERT H. PHELPS & E.
DOUGLAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 102 (1966). The statute of
limitations is one year in “Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.”
Id. at 102. The statute of limitations is two years in “Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin.” Id. at 102. A three year statute of
limitations is applied in “Arkansas, Delaware, New Mexico and Vermont.” Id. at 102. According
to Black’s Law Dictionary, “statute of limitations” is “[a] law that bars claims after a specified
period…a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the
claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered). The purpose of such a statute is
to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in
legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while evidence is reasonably available and
fresh.” Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1636 (10th ed. 2014).
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to sue Cox Enterprises over 20 years after the initial report because it resurfaced in the
Tuscaloosa News interview that resulted in the five articles published in the Sunday Atlanta
Journal and Constitution.417
Since Holt was allowed to sue for defamation, a student-athlete can likely file a
defamation lawsuit so long as the student-athlete remains within the confines of the NCAA rules,
regulations, and within statutory limitations.
3. Current Literature
In “Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: the Case of Failed Reporting and an NFL
Drug Test,” published in the Sports Lawyers’ Journal, addresses similar issues as the study at
hand,418 Stephen G. Strauss attempts to answer the question of whether statements made in
regard to student-athletes’ off the field activities–sexual orientation, domestic violence, and
marital problems–are defamatory.420 Strauss questioned whether such statements are
actionable.421
To attack questions surrounding student-athletes and defamation, Strauss compared Holt
v. Cox Enterprise to a situation surrounding former University of Miami football player, James
417

Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 410. The articles were written by Darrell Simmons, defendant to the
action. The fact that Holt commented on the incident is a significant element in determining
whether Holt is a public figure or private person under defamation law. Following Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., whether the plaintiff “thrust himself or his views into public controversy to
influence others” was a significant element in determining if the plaintiff was a public figure or
private person for purposes of a defamation claim.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION:
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-35 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting Gertz,
418 U.S. 345 (1974).
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Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: The Case of Failed Reporting and
an NFL Drug Test, 33 SPORTS LAW. J. 51, 51 (1996).
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Stewart, and his battle with the New York Times.422 James Stewart was a running back on the
University of Miami football team. 423 He entered the National Football League (NFL) draft in
January of 1995.424 While at a NFL scouting combine, Stewart submitted to a urinalysis testing
his urine for the presence of drugs. 425 Although Stewart tested negative for any traces of drugs in
his system, the New York Times published “Sapp Fails Drug Test at NFL Combine” reporting
that James Stewart tested positive for marijuana. 426 With no retraction from the New York Times,
Stewart sued the New York Times for defamation.427 Strauss, however, failed to give a bright line
answer in his analysis.
Strauss analyzed whether Stewart would be deemed a public figure or private person. 428
Strauss says that declaring Stewart a public figure is left to the will of the court. 429 However, if
Stewart is declared a public figure by the court his claim may be deemed non-actionable because
the public figure status affects the New York Times’ ability to assert First Amendment
privilege.430 Further, if declared a public figure, Stewart would also have to prove actual malice
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on behalf of the New York Times whereas if Stewart is deemed a private person, he need only
prove negligence. 431
Comparing Stewart’s case to Holt’s, Strauss drew similarities between the two athletes in
that they were both members of collegiate football teams and the topic of conversation and
articles surrounding the game. 432 However, Strauss believed Stewart’s case was distinguishable
from Holt v. Cox Enterprise in that the alleged defamatory statement did not concern Stewart’s
activity on the field. 433 Instead, the article centered around Stewart’s off-the-field conduct—a
drug test.434 Additionally, the drug test occurred after Stewart’s collegiate career, but before his
NFL career. Strauss asserted that Stewart could argue that although he is a public figure due to
his presence and activity on a high profile collegiate football team (Stewart actively worked to be
a starter on Alabama’s football team), the drug test at the center of the alleged defamatory
statement falls within a private realm of his life. 435
By examining the Holt v. Cox Enterprise case and a situation surrounding former
University of Miami football player, James Stewart, Strauss concluded that determining whether
the athlete will be considered a public figure or private person is left to the discretion of the court
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Id. While the argument is made that Stewart’s case is distinguishable from Holt in that the
alleged defamatory statement did not concern Stewart’s activity on the field, a drug test does still
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on a case-by-case basis.436 Courts have not given an umbrella determination declaring all athletes
public figures.437 The courts tend to determine this on the facts of each individual case. 438
However, using Holt as a foundation, an athlete can draw similarities and distinctions between
their status as a public figure or private person using the facts of Holt being declared a public
figure.439
Noticeable of the relevant case law and literature is the fact that in both instances, the
plaintiffs did not bring a cause of action until they were former NCAA student-athletes. With no
case law on current NCAA student-athletes bringing defamation claims against media entities,
this thesis asks “why?” Are athletes contracting away certain rights when joining the NCAA?
4. NCAA Rules & Regulations
The final issue regarding student-athletes’ ability to bring a defamation claim is the
question of whether NCAA student-athletes contract out of their rights to sue. When an athlete
joins a NCAA collegiate athletic team, the student-athlete enters into an “at will” agreement.440
This means the athlete and university enter into a legal agreement "subject to one's discretion”
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that is “able to be terminated or discharged by either party without cause.” 441 Both parties must
enter into the agreement voluntarily. 442 Neither can compel the other to do so. 443
For that athlete to be a part of the athletic program, however, the athlete must meet three
requirements. 444 The athlete must “meet minimal academic entrance standards, become a student
at the university, and qualify as an amateur.” 445 According to the NCAA, the principal of
amateurism states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical,
mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.446
If the athlete does not meet these three requirements, the university is not allowed to associate
with the athlete whatsoever. 447
Upon entering into this agreement, the student-athlete agrees to comply with the
regulations of the university in line with the NCAA compliance regulations.448 Using the

441

At Will, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 155 (10th ed. 2014).

442

Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Assignment of Legal Rights, 35
St. Louis U.L.J. 39, 51 (1990).
443

Id.

444

Id.

445

Id.

446

See, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, CONST. § 2.9.

447

Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Assignment of Legal Rights, 35
St. Louis U.L.J. 39, 51 (1990).
448

Id.

69

Louisiana State University Compliance paperwork as a guide, 449 the athlete must agree to the
terms of the compliance paperwork. In doing so, the student-athlete agrees to a “media release
statement” in which the athlete
Grant[s] permission for all sports contests, practices, news conferences and other
related events in which I participate or for which I am present as a student-athlete
of LSU (collectively referred to as “Events” to be broadcast, re-broadcast or
otherwise transmitted and distributed, in whole or in part, on television, by
internet and by any other means (collectively referred to as “Broadcasts”). I
acknowledge and agree that the copyright to each Broadcast will initially vest in
the broadcaster of each such Event, and that each broadcaster and its assignees
and licensees will have and enjoy non-exclusive, transferable, perpetual right to
use (and to license and sub-license, without limitation) any such Broadcasts.
I also acknowledge and agree that LSU, the Southeastern Conference (SEC), the
NCAA and each broadcaster may use my picture and name to promote and
publicize LSU, the SEC, and the NCAA and their carious sports contests,
practices, news conferences and other related sports events (including in
programs, media guides, television spots and other media) and for other news and
information purposes.450
However, there is no language within the contract that prohibits a student-athlete from bringing a
defamation claim.451
The student- athletes do, however, sign a “Social Networking Responsibility
Statement.”452 The statement holds the student-athlete responsible for posting any posts which
may be in violation of LSU’s policies and the student code of conduct. 453 Posting content of
alcohol, illegal drugs, profanity, hazing, discriminatory content, or sexually explicit activity may
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result in disciplinary action. 454 This rule is enforced because social media content is readily
available to the general public and “may have implications for your personal safety and image,
the image of your teammates and coaches, and the image of LSU, as well as future career and
professional opportunities.”455
The social networking responsibility statement also provides recommended guidelines for
social media behavior explaining “any text or photo posted on a social networking site is no
longer your property alone and what can be done with it is out of your control.” 456 The guidelines
suggest their posts be carefully monitored so as to best protect themselves, their family, and the
university.457 Furthermore, the statement explains any post made by the student-athlete has the
potential to be seen by future employers, affecting their job prospects in the future. 458 Finally, to
monitor student-athlete activity, the student-athlete is required to register with U-Diligence.459
Despite the Social Networking Responsibility Statement, there is still no mention of a
student-athlete’s ability to sue for defamation. One can conclude, based on the compliance
contract, a student-athlete does not forfeit their right to sue for defamation.
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B. Defamation and the Student-Athlete Plaintiff: Public Official, Private Person, Public
Figure, and Matters of Public Concern
Assuming the student-athlete can bring a defamation claim against a media entity, the
next question is to determine what plaintiff status the court would give the student-athlete. The
court must declare the plaintiff a public official, public figure, or a private person. 460 Whether the
matter is one of public concern is also relevant in determining the degree of constitutional
protection for the alleged defamatory speech.461 With limited case law on the topic of defamation
pertaining to NCAA student-athletes, it is necessary to analogize with other relevant litigation.
For instance, there is ample litigation present concerning defamation of coaches, high school
athletes, and professional athletes. 462 Exploring such areas of litigation will allow one to
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In a defamation case, a court will consider the plaintiff either a public official, a public figure
or a private person. New York Times v. Sullivan declared public officials must prove actual
malice in order to meet their burden of proof in defamation cases. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON
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analogize how such case law is applicable to the questions at hand and what route the court may
take in defamation cases of NCAA student-athletes.
1. Public Official
a. In General
A public official is, “Someone who holds or is invested with a public office; a person
elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government's sovereign powers.” 463 A
student-athlete is not a public official because a student-athlete is
a student whose enrollment was solicited by a member of the athletics staff or
other representative of athletics interests with a view toward the student’s ultimate
participation in the intercollegiate athletics program. Any other student becomes a
student-athlete only when the student reports for an intercollegiate squad that is
under the jurisdiction of the athletics department, as specified in Constitution
3.2.4.5.464
By comparison, because a student-athlete does not meet the definition of public official in that a
student-athlete is a student and not a member of public office, the public official category is
eliminated as an option in determining a student-athlete’s plaintiff class. Most cases seem to
automatically discount the idea of a coach or athlete being considered a public official. 465
O’Connor v. Burningham, however, provides an in-depth explanation as to why the court did not
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public official under the relevant decisions of this Court.).
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declare a coach a public official. As such, it is helpful case law to draw an analogy between
why the court did not declare a coach a public official and why a student-athlete would not be a
public official.
b. Case Law Analogy
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed a motion for summary judgment against a
high school basketball coach, Michael O’Connor.466 The motion for summary judgment was
granted in favor of the defendants, declaring O’Connor a public official in the defamation claim
he brought against the parents of his former athletes. 467
The Supreme Court of Utah relied on the rulings of Rosenblatt v. Baer468 and Curtis v.
Butts469 to guide their decision declaring O’Connor was not a public official.470 In his opinion,
Justice Nehring recalled the language of Baer which said a public official was one “[w]here a
position in government has such apparent importance that that public has an independent interest
in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public
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In Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court held in regard to a public official, “Where a position in
government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in
the qualifications and performance of all government employees, both elements we identified in
New York Times are present and the New York Times malice standards apply.” Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383, U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
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interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees.”471 Justice Nehring
used the Curtis v. Butts ruling to determine what type of person rose to the level of having
“apparent importance” stating, “Had the Supreme Court deemed Wally Butts, the defamed
plaintiff and University of Georgia athletic director, a public official, we would have been more
sympathetic to the Parents’ contention that the Lenhi High School women’s basketball coach
should qualify as well.”472
Wally Butts was a collegiate coach and athletic director but was not considered a public
official because he was employed by a private corporation.473 The Utah Supreme Court agreed
with Chief Justice Warren’s concurring opinion when he explained that had the technicality of
private employment not intervened, Wally Butts still would not have been considered a public
official.474 The Utah Supreme Court stated that if a university coach did not rise to the level of
being a public official neither should the lesser high school coach. 475 The Utah Supreme Court
explicitly followed the Butts Court when stating that high school coaches are not public
officials.476
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By analysis, one can conclude student-athletes are not public officials. A coach is
superior in rank to the athlete. 477 The coach is the leader of the team in that the coach is the “one
who instructs players in the fundamentals of a sport and directs team strategy.” 478 The
athlete is the player taking direction and instruction from the coach in that the athlete is “a
person who is trained or skilled in…sports.” 479 O’Connor was not a public official as a high
school coach as Wally Butts was not a public official as a collegiate coach. 480 If a coach does not
qualify as a public official, neither should a student-athlete.
2. Private Person
a. In General
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a private person is, “Someone who does not hold
public office or serve in the military; an entity such as a corporation or partnership that is
governed by private law.”481 In Warford v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held the plaintiff was considered a private person because, “the plaintiff's failure to
thrust himself into a public controversy to influence the outcome of the issues, as well fail[ed] to
assume a role of public prominence in the controversy.” 482
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The result of being declared a private person plaintiff is that the plaintiff is not required to
prove actual malice in most circumstances.483 In fact, Gertz stated that individual states may
choose their standard of law pertaining to private person plaintiffs. 484 The general standard is
that a state cannot have a burden of proof less than negligence. 485 Negligence is
The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal
standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except
for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others'
rights486
The prima facie case for negligence is first, the plaintiff must have an injury caused by
the defendant. 487 Second, the defendant must have had a duty to protect the plaintiff from the
alleged injury and failed to do so. 488 Proving negligence results in compensatory damages 489 for
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Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Id. at 6-3–6-5.
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the plaintiff.490 The plaintiff need only prove negligence by a “preponderance of the evidence,” a
lower standard to that of “clear and convincing” as seen with actual malice. 491 However, some
states apply the actual malice standard by choice. 492
Additionally, the particular issue or controversy at hand may be one of public concern. 493
If so, that fact carries significant repercussions in determining who has the burden of proof in
proving truth or falsity in a defamation suit brought by a private plaintiff. 494 In Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the U.S. Supreme Court held the private plaintiff must prove falsity,
abandoning the “common law presumption that defamatory speech is false,” when:
(1) The defamatory speech at issue is of “public concern,”
(2) The defendant is a member of the media, and
(3) The action is for damages. 495
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applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for
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2014).
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The Court made this holding as a way to protect the First Amendment and the ability of
communicators to inform the public on issues they have a right in knowing. 496 Issues of public
interest include “ complaints by a private citizen to a superior about the conduct of a public
employee, statements to government officials in connection with the qualifications of bidders for
public works contracts, reports of criminal activity to a proper authority, and testimony before
investigating commissions.”497 The plaintiff must prove the allegedly defamatory statement was
false by a preponderance of the evidence. 498 Making an analogy to available case law helps in
understanding how the private person status might apply to student-athletes.
b. Case Law Analogy
Ackerman v. Paulauskas is an example of a case in which a college basketball coach was
declared a private person plaintiff to a defamation suit and, as such, was not required to meet the
actual malice standard. 499 Hired in 1999, Paul Ackerman was the men’s basketball coach at
Assumption College.500 Ackerman’s contract was renewed annually. 501 In December of 2004,
however, Assumption College’s athletic director, Theodore Paulauskas, informed Ackerman his
contract would not be renewed in the upcoming year.502 Additionally, Paulauskas asked

496

Id.

497

Id. at 9-34.

498

Id. at 3-16.

499

Ackerman v. Paulauskas, 25 Mass. L. Rep. 527, 7 (2009).

500

Id. at 1.

501

Id.

502

Id. at 7.

79

Ackerman to resign in February of 2005, prior to the duration of his contract, so Paulauskas
could begin the search for a new coach. 503
Following his February resignation, the Worcester Telegram & Gazette published an
interview in which Paulauskas said, “The program wasn’t on the right path and the prospects
didn’t look good…[w]e’re not looking for a quick fix. We’re looking to build a basketball
program, one that will contend every year for a conference title.” 504 In the article Paulauskas also
said, “I am looking for someone who is going to get to the office before me and leave after
me.”505
On August 17, 2005, Ackerman sued Paulauskas and Assumption College for
defamation.506 The Superior Court of Massachusetts applied Massachusetts’ two-pronged test to
determine if Ackerman was a public figure. Under this test, Ackerman would be declared a
limited-purpose public figure if “he either (1) voluntarily inject[ed] himself into a particular
public controversy, or (2) engage[d] the public’s attention in an attempt to influence the outcome
of a public controversy.”507 The Superior Court of Massachusetts held that the comments at
issue were not a result of Ackerman thrusting himself into a controversy or “engaging the public
in an attempt to influence the outcome of a controversy.” 508 Further, while the Telegram may
have reported on Ackerman a great deal whilst he was the basketball coach, he was still not a
503
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public figure.509 Consequently, the Superior Court of Massachusetts declared Ackerman a private
person and did not require him to meet the actual malice standard. 510 It is worth nothing the
Superior Court of Massachusetts did not say why Ackerman was not a public figure, only that he
was not.511
If Ackerman as a collegiate coach is considered a private person, 512 a student-athlete in a
similar situation may be considered a private person plaintiff as well. The student-athlete reports
to the coach who is the leader in that the coach instructs the players and directs the team. 513
The athlete is the player taking direction, instruction, and training from the coach. 514 If the coach,
under these circumstances, is declared a private plaintiff, then a student-athlete may also be
declared a private person plaintiff in the same situation. The decision is ultimately left to the
discretion of the court. 515 Supporting this finding is the case of Cottrell v. NCAA.
Cottrell v. NCAA is a case about two college football coaches. It is a helpful case in
distinguishing plaintiff classification because the two coaches were considered two plaintiffs in a
singular case who were given separate plaintiff statuses—one plaintiff was considered a public
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figure while the other was considered a private plaintiff. 516 This is particularly helpful because
the Supreme Court of Alabama was clear in distinguishing between a public figure and private
person. As such, this case may assist in analogizing how a student-athlete might be categorized
as a private person in a defamation claim.
In 2002, two former football coaches from the University of Alabama, Ronald Cottrell
and Ivy Williams, sued the NCAA and sportswriter, Tom Culpepper, for defamation. 517 Ronald
Cottrell was the recruiting coordinator for the University of Alabama football team.518 Williams
was an assistant coach. 519
The NCAA investigated the University of Alabama for allegations of recruitment
violations surrounding a high school recruit, Albert Means. 520 It was believed Means’ high
school coach, Logan Young, solicited money from collegiate athletic programs–namely, the
University of Alabama– in exchange for the opportunity to recruit Means to play college
football.521 The NCAA investigation was supposed to be confidential. 522 Nonetheless, to help
the media stay abreast with the progress of the investigation, the media received access to
information.523
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Over the course of the investigation, Culpepper, a sportswriter, “made references to the
coaches at The University as being “cheaters—recruiting cheaters” and references to Williams as
being a person who “funneled money” from Young to Means.” 524 Additionally, Culpepper
“made statements” about Cottrell saying “Cottrell had abandoned his family in Tallahassee; that
Cottrell and his assistant had stolen videotapes from The University’s athletic department; and
that Cottrell had stolen funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation.” 525 The University of
Alabama fired both Cottrell and Williams in 2000, but the NCAA investigation reports showed
no evidence their firing was a result of NCAA compliance violations. 526
The NCAA issued a letter of official inquiry (LOI) only to Cottrell and Williams. 527
“Williams’s LOI charged that he had committed rule violations when he allegedly
knew that Means’s high school coach had requested money and a vehicle from
Young to encourage Means to sign a scholarship to play football for The
University and did not report the recruiting misconduct to The University, the
SEC, or the NCAA.”528
The LOI also accused Williams of exceeding the permitted amount of visits to a high school and
providing misleading information about Means. 529 Williams admitted to violating the rule
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regulating the number of visits to a high school. 530 However, Williams was not personally
charged because this was an infraction by the university. 531
Cottrell’s LOI stated Cottrell violated NCAA regulations in that he received two
unauthorized loans from Young, he “knowingly provided misleading information regarding the
loans,” and he did not report academic fraud regarding a recruit’s ACT score. 532 Cottrells’ LOI
also charged him with allowing a recruit to make phone calls from his office, negotiating with
police to have a speeding ticket voided for a student-athlete, and allowed a staff member to drive
a student-athlete to his personal home without authorization.533 Cottrell admitted to all charges
against him.534 Like Williams, Cottrell was not personally charged as these were all violations
considered against the university. 535
The NCAA issued an infraction report on the University of Alabama in 2002 which
“focused on the conduct of a “rogue” football athletic representative and some of “the largest
money amounts” alleged in any NCAA rule-violation case involving the recruitment of a
prospective student-athlete.”536 The report also stated “an eight-year show-cause restriction was
imposed against the “recruiting coordinator” and employees.” 537 When Cottrell and Williams
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sued the NCAA and Culpepper in 2002 they alleged that the NCAA and Culpepper conspired
together to cause the false statements that destroyed their reputations and ended their careers as
college football coaches. 538
In determining their plaintiff status, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered this
matter one of public concern. 539 This is significant because as a matter of public concern, the
speech was afforded greater First Amendment protection, making it harder for the plaintiffs to
recover.540 The Supreme Court of Alabama considered the degree to which the coaches were
involved in the matter of public concern, the degree to which they were pulled in to the
controversy, whether they thrust themselves into the public sphere concerning this issue, and
their position within the football program. 541
Williams was declared a private plaintiff because, as an assistant coach, he “was neither
in such a position of public prominence that he was in a position to influence others, or the
outcome of the controversy, nor did he enjoy regular and continuing access to the media.” 542
Cottrell, however, was declared a limited-purpose public figure. 543 Cottrell’s job as recruiting
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coordinator was much more high profile than Williams’ position as assistant coach. 544 As
recruiting coordinator, Cottrell had access to the media, giving him the opportunity to defend the
defamatory statements. 545 This access also allowed him the opportunity to “influence the
outcome of the controversy that a private person would not have.” 546
Because Cottrell v. NCAA contained two plaintiffs in which one was considered a public
figure while the other was considered a private plaintiff, 547 it is a strong example of how fact
specific the court considers cases when determining the status of a defamation plaintiff. The
court also would likely take a fact specific approach to determine whether a student-athlete was a
public figure or a private person.
In Cottrell v. NCAA there are two coaches, in the same claim, yet they were declared
different types of plaintiffs. 548 The same could be true for student-athletes. If the student-athlete
is more characteristic of a Cottrell-type plaintiff–the student-athlete has a high profile position,
have ample access to the media to defend themselves and the ability to influence the outcome of
the controversy–the student-athlete will likely be considered a public figure. 549 However, if the
student-athlete does not have the same characteristics of Cottrell, but, instead, is more
characteristic of a Williams-type plaintiff–the student-athlete is not in a “position of public
prominence,” the athlete’s position cannot “influence others, or the outcome of the controversy,”
544
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and the athlete’s did “enjoy regular and continuing access to the media”–the athlete will likely be
a private person plaintiff. 550
Based on the case law analogy, it is fair to conclude there are instances in which a
student-athlete may be declared a private plaintiff, just as collegiate coaches have been declared
as such.551 The determination will likely be fact dependent and determined on a case by case
basis.552 That being said, most case law points to college coaches and professional athletes being
declared public figures logically linking student-athletes to being declared a public figure as
well.553
3. Public Figure
As previously explained, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., was a seminal case in explaining
who is considered a public figure and how a public figure differs from a private plaintiff.554
Specifically, the Court said a public figure is one who “assume[d] special prominence in the
affairs of society and to have assume[d] special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.”555 These public figures were said, by the Court, to have “voluntarily exposed
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themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood.” 556 Additionally, public
figures have greater access to media outlets, affording them a greater opportunity to defend
themselves to the public against defamatory speech. 557 The degree of access to the media a
plaintiff has is a reoccurring theme in determining their plaintiff status—the more access a
plaintiff has to the media to defend themselves from the defamatory statement, the more likely
the plaintiff will be considered a public figure. 558
A person need not meet all the descriptions of a public figure to be considered such.559 In
fact, the Court recognized that a person likely will not meet all these public figure descriptions
because situations differ factually on a case by case basis. 560 For this reason, all the descriptions
given by the court do not make an explicit definition of a public figure, they are merely
guidelines the lower courts apply.561 Consequently, the lower courts created subcategories of
public figures consisting of “all-purpose” public figures and “limited-purpose” public figures.562
a. All-Purpose Public Figures
All-purpose public figures are also referred to as “pervasive public figures” because they
are people who “occupy positions of such pervasive power and influence that they are deemed
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public figures for all purposes.”563 These are people who voluntarily relinquish a degree of
protection by stepping in to a publicly visible position.564 In the 1982 case Harris v. Tomzcazk,
Judge Lawrence K. Karlton of the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of California
defined an all-purpose public figure as
A person whose name is immediately recognized by a large percentage of the
relevant population, whose activities are followed by that group with interest, and
whose opinions or conduct by virtue of these facts, can reasonably be expected to
be known and considered by that group in the course of their own individual
decision-making.565
However, all-purpose public figures are not limited to those with influential power. 566
While Gertz defined a public figure as a person who “occup[ies] positions of such pervasive
power and influence,” it also defined a public person as one who gains the public’s attention as a
result of “general fame or notoriety in the community.”567
People often considered all-purpose public figures are popular actors and actresses,
“successful athletes,” and other “household names.” 568 They are declared such because they have
voluntarily subjected their work to the public eye and gained success, money, and fame. 569
Historically, case law suggests a plaintiff being declared an all-purpose public figure tends to
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turn on this fact—whether the plaintiff voluntarily subjected his work to the public eye so as to
gain success.570 As a result he has relinquished a great deal of the reputational protection he
would otherwise be granted as a private person. 571
b. Limited-Purpose Public Figures
Limited-purpose public figures are also referred to as “vortex public figures.” 572 Gertz
described these individuals as ones who “have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” 573 A “public
controversy” is not any topic that interests the public.574 A matter of public controversy is limited
to what the court discretionally views as acceptable public discussion. 575 For example, a divorce
proceeding is not an issue of public controversy or discussion just because it piques the public’s
interest.576 In the 1980 case of Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia defined public controversy as “a dispute that in fact has received public
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attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct participants.” 577
Limiting matters of public controversies as such eliminates mere curiosity and gossip from
protected speech. 578
In the event a person subjects himself to the public eye surrounding an event that is not a
“controversy” (e.g. a major sporting event or entertainment event), that person is said to have
sufficiently thrust himself into the vortex for purposes of being classified as a limited-purpose
public figure so long as the act was voluntary and public.579 “Hav[ing] thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved”580 is the biggest factor in declaring plaintiffs limited-purpose public figures.581
When limited-purpose public figures’ reputations are harmed due to a statement made
surrounding their involvement in that particular public controversy, the limited-purpose public
figures forfeit a degree of reputational protection because they “propel[ed] themselves into the
Id. at 5-59. According to sack on defamation, “An investigation into alleged industry
corruption or drug dealing would, for example, meet this [the District of Columbia’s] test.” Id.
See, Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc. 627 F.2d 1287 (1980).
577
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Id. at 5-60. A common concern is the concept of “bootstrapping.” This means a journalist has
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especially if the topic is a private concern. This concept implies the possibility of an involuntary
public figure. Because there is no such recognized category, it would be very rare to find an
involuntary public figure Id. at 5-62.
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vortex of public disputes.”582 Several lower courts developed tests to determine who falls into the
limited-purpose public figure category. 583 For example, the Second Circuit said the plaintiff
must have
(1) Successfully invited public attention to his views in an effort to influence
others prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected
himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (3)
assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintained
regular and continuing access to the media. 584
To consider a plaintiff a limited-purpose public figure in the Sixth Circuit, “(1) a public
controversy must exist; and (2) the nature and extent of the individual’s participation in the
particular controversy must be ascertained.” 585 Within the second prong, the Sixth Circuit Court
also considers, how voluntary the participation in the controversy was, how much access the
plaintiff had to communications to rebut the statement, and how significant a role the plaintiff
played in the public controversy. 586 Similarly, in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, asks the following questions in determining if a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public
figure:
(1) Is there a public controversy?
(2) Has the plaintiff played a sufficiently central role in the controversy?
(3) Is the alleged defamatory statement germane to the plaintiff’s participation in
the controversy?587
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The greatest consequence of being declared a public figure plaintiff is that the plaintiff is
faced with the task of proving actual malice on behalf of the defendant. 588 This means the
plaintiff must show the defendant made the alleged defamatory statement “with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.” 589 Relying on the ruling in
Garrison v. Louisiana, the plaintiff must prove the statement was made “with a high degree of
awareness of [its] probable falsity.” 590
This burden of proof is on the plaintiff and they prove it by presenting evidence of the
alleged act.591 The plaintiff must answer the following elements of actual malice:
1. What made you believe the accusation?
2. Did anything cause you to doubt it?592
Actual malice must be present at the time of publication.593 Essentially, the defendant must have
published a false statement and knew it was false at the time of publication. 594 If a defendant
published a false statement but did not know it was false at publication, he is not liable for

588

Id. at 5-74.

589

Id. at 5-74 n. 456 (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80).

590

Id. at 5-75 n. 462. Note, this is a departure from the professional standard that asks how a
reasonable person in the same profession would act under similar circumstances. Id. at 5-75.
591

Id. at 5-75.

BARBARA DILL, THE JOURNALIST’S HANDBOOK ON LIBEL AND PRIVACY 34 (The Free Press
1986).
592

593

SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-78 (Keith Voelker, 4th
ed. 2010).
594

Id. at 5-78–5-79.

93

publication with actual malice. 595 The defendant reporter can overcome actual malice by
providing her own evidence with the sources she believed were credible.596
c. Case Law Analogy
The only found litigation of a NCAA student-athlete bringing a defamation action and
best case law example pertaining to the questions at hand is the case of Holt v. Cox Enterprise.597
On November 18, 1961, the University of Alabama (“Alabama”) and Georgia Tech
competed in a “highly publicized football game.”598 In the fourth quarter, Alabama’s Darwin
Holt hit Georgia Tech’s Chick Graning. 599 Graning suffered from injuries consisting of “a broken
jaw, a broken nose, a concussion, and the loss of several teeth.” 600 Officials did not call any sort
of penalty against Holt, igniting a national conversation about the hit. 601 While Holt, himself, did
not comment on the issue at the time, many journalists published articles on the incident. 602
Years later, in 1979, the narrative resurfaced. 603 At this time, Holt participated in an
interview with The Tuscaloosa News resulting in a series of five articles published in the Sunday
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Atlanta Journal and Constitution.604 The articles revisited the famous hit and cited many
comments made about Holt following the game. 605 The articles included phrases describing the
hit such as, “old Alabama greeting “pow” right in the kisser, a “cheap shot” a “flying elbow,”
Holt’s “latest act of violence,” an “illegal” blow, and the striking of Graning “so savage[e] and
unexplainabl[e].”606
In 1984, over 20 years after the Holt-Graining hit, Holt sued Cox Enterprises, Inc. for
libel607 and invasion of privacy. 608 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
found the published statements about Holt referred to his experience as a college athlete and
injured his reputation to the degree of rising to defamation. 609 The U.S. District Court did,
however, declare Holt a limited-purpose public figure because
As a member of the Alabama football team, Holt voluntarily played that sport
[football] before thousands of persons – spectators and sportswriters alike – and
he necessarily assumed the risk that these persons would comment on the manner
in which he performed. The defamatory comments in the articles relate solely to
Holt’s play on the field and are thus within the limited range of issues upon which
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Holt invited comment. Holt, like other sports figures who have sought redress
through defamation actions…must be considered a public figure, whose actions
on the field sportswriters may criticize within the protective “breathing space”
required by the First Amendment.610
Finding he was a limited-purpose public figure escalated the plaintiff’s burden of proving
fault to that of proving “actual malice.” 611 Actual malice was established in New York Times v.
Sullivan.612 The Court defined actual malice as, “publication with knowledge that the offending
statement is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” 613 This standard
provided more protection to the media against being held liable for harming the reputation of
public figures on a matter of public concern. 614 Unable to prove actual malice, Holt failed in his
effort to recover damages. 615
This case is distinguishable from the query of determining whether a student-athlete
would be considered a public figure or private person in that Holt was a former NCAA studentathlete, depleting his NCAA eligibility more than a decade prior to the law suit.616 The U.S.
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District Court addressed Holt’s status as a former student-athlete.617 Holt claimed his role as an
Alabama football player should not sway the court to declare him a public figure because his
involvement with the football team greatly pre-dated the trial, making it no longer relevant. 618
However, the court said whether Holt brought the claim in 1964 or 1979 was immaterial to his
status as a limited-purpose public figure because he was declared so for several reasons.619
To start, Holt continued to have access to the press for several years following his
collegiate athletic career up to a month before the five articles at issue were published. 620 Holt’s
conduct on the field was also an issue of public interest.621 Additionally, the public had a
significant interest in the hit and how it affected the Georgia Tech-Alabama game.622
Holt also argued he should not be considered a public figure because he was not a
professional athlete. 623 The court declared
By voluntarily engaging in a highly publicized sporting event, Holt necessarily
attracted publicity. He had been the subject of press recognition even before the
incident occurred. That Holt was not paid for his performance does not alter the
fact that once he played in a public contest he was bound, if successful to
encounter substantial recognition of a comment upon both his good and bad
play.624
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Holt’s final argument was that as an Alabama football player, his intentions were to only enter a
“small part of the public scene.” 625 Quoting the ruling of Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises,
Inc.,626 the court declared, “It is no answer to the assertion that one is a public figure to say,
truthfully, that one doesn’t choose to be.” 627 In other words, Holt’s feelings of not wanting to be
a public figure had no bearing on the fact that he was a public figure.628
One can draw the clearest conclusion—although still not a bright line rule—by
comparing the Holt v. Cox Enterprises case to a current student-athlete. Holt’s time as a studentathlete did not make him an all-purpose public figure because he “ha[d] not achieved such
pervasive fame or notoriety that he [had become] a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts.”629 His notoriety was limited to the arena and public eye surrounding his sport. 630
Similarly, if a student-athlete was only recognized within her specific playing field and only in
the public light pertaining to that arena, she would likely not be declared an all-purpose public
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figure, as Holt was not. On the other hand, just as Holt was declared a limited-purpose public
figure, the student-athlete might be considered a limited-purpose public figure for her notoriety
within her arena.
Holt was a former student-athlete. The U.S. District Court, however, felt this distinction
was minor due to the fact that there were so many other factors supporting Holt’s classification
as a limited-purpose public figure.631 For example, because Holt was voluntarily in a highly
publicized sport, he had access to the press, and his actions were ones of public interest, he was a
limited-purpose public figure.633 Therefore, if student-athletes similarly participate in highlypublicized sports and have access to media, they would likely be considered a limited-purpose
public figure.
d. Synthesizing Public Figures
Holt is not the only student-athlete in the collegiate or high school athletic arena whom
courts have deemed a public figure.634 Courts also have found coaches, professional athletes, and
high school athletes to be public figures. 635 In fact, many courts “have concluded professional
and collegiate athletes and coaches are at least limited-purpose public figures.”636 The United
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See, e.g., Kirk, 1988 Tenn. App. at 13; Sarandrea, 30 Pa. D. at 210(which stated, “In
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States District Court for the Northern District of California said a “common thread in these cases
is that one's voluntary decision to pursue a career in sports, whether as an athlete or a coach,
“invites attention and comment” regarding his job performance and thus constitutes an
assumption of the risk of negative publicity.” 637
The Gertz Court declared public figures: “assumed prominence in society,638 voluntarily
exposed themselves to falsehood, and639 had greater access to the media to defend themselves
against defamatory speech.” 640 These factors did not create an explicit definition of a public
figure; they were merely guidelines for the lower courts to apply.641 The Holt court applied
similar standards, declaring Holt a limited-purpose public figure because he “[1] voluntarily
played that sport [football] before thousands of persons – spectators and sportswriters alike…[2]
necessarily assumed the risk that these persons would comment on the manner in which he
performed…[3] [and the alleged defamatory statement] relate[d] solely to Holt’s play on the
field.”642 Other courts applied their own unique factors. Common amongst all the courts,
however, is that a public figure is someone who: voluntarily thrust himself into the public

637

McGarry, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 115 (quoting Barry v. Time, Inc. 584 F. Supp. 1110,
1119(1984)).
638

SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-21, n. 151– 152 (Keith
Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
639

Id. at 5-21 n. 154 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–345).

640

Id. at 5-21 n. 153 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344).

641

Id. at 5-21.

642

Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 412.

100

controversy,643 invited public attention, thus necessarily assuming the risk of defamation,644 and
had greater access to the media.645
A court ultimately has the discretion to declare a student-athlete a public figure or private
person. 646 Combing the factors of previous case law, however, one can conclude that if a
student-athlete voluntarily thrust himself into the public controversy, 647 invited public attention
assuming the risk of defamation,648 and had greater access to media to defend their reputation, 649
a court will likely declare the student-athlete a limited-purpose public figure.
C. NCAA Student-Athletes and Non-Media Defendants
1. Suing a Non-Media Defendant
Regardless of the party being a media or non-media defendant, the plaintiff’s ability to
bring a cause of action turns on the fact that “virtually any person or nongovernmental entity that
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makes a defamatory false statement and is capable of being sued may be liable therefor.” 650 The
U.S. Constitution, Article IV, section 2, paragraph 1651 affords all citizens the basic right to bring
suit in a court of law. 652 In fact, Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. explained this right is a
cornerstone of “orderly government” and must be allowed “by each State to the citizens of all
other States.”653 However, just because a plaintiff can sue does not mean he will automatically
be successful in his efforts. The plaintiff must, first, meet the prima facie case for defamation.
First, the plaintiff must show the alleged defamatory statement was published in a manner
accessible to a third party.654 To publish means “to distribute copies (of a work) to the public. To
communicate (defamatory words) to someone other than the person defamed.” 655 The alleged
defamatory statement must also “cause damage to someone’s good name or reputation”656
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The plaintiff must also prove the alleged defamatory statement false whether the plaintiff
is a public official, public figure, private person, or it is an issue of public concern.657 In
Phialdelphia Newspaper v. Hepps, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that matters of public
concern demand greater constitutional protection to inform and protect the public.658 New York
Times v. Sullivan only required a public figure prove falsity to recover in a defamation suit on
matters of public concern. 659 However, Phildelphia Newspaper v. Hepps expanded upon this,
requiring a private person plaintiff also show the alleged defamatory statement as false when it is
a matter of public concern. 660 The Court implemented this standard of law to prevent a chilling
effect.661 Falsity is a required element because “to do otherwise could only result in a deterrence
of speech which the Constitution makes free.”662
Finally, the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s negligence or actual malice in making
the statement.663 In a defamation case, the court will consider the plaintiff either a public figure
or a private person.664 A public figure is one who “occup[ies] [a] position of such persuasive
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power and influence” that the figure is a public figure for all purposes. 665 Public figures must
prove actual malice on behalf of the defendant in a defamation suit. 666 Actual malice is
“publication with knowledge that the offending statement is false or with reckless disregard of
whether it is false or not.” 667 In contrast, a private person plaintiff to a defamation suit has the
burden of proof set forth by that particular state. 668 Most states adopted negligence as the burden
of proving fault for a private person claiming defamation. 669 If an NCAA student-athlete meets
the above elements, it is likely she has a viable claim to bring against the defendant.670
2. Non-Media Defendant, Public or Private Plaintiff?
Despite the difference of the defendant being a non-media entity, the student-athlete’s
classification as a public figure or private person plaintiff is still likely fact dependent and
determined on a case by case basis.671
Recall in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared the standard for a non-media defendant in a defamation case. 672 In 1985, Greenmoss
Builders sued Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. for defamation when Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. released an
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incorrect bankruptcy report to five of their subscribers.673 The Court was and remains reluctant in
relying on the Gertz actual malice standard because it was a split decision. 674 The Court observed
that some states do not allow plaintiffs to sue private defendants and only apply the Gertz actual
malice standard to “institutional media.” 675
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, however, the U.S. Supreme Court was
more concerned with protecting actual speech than the status of the defendant becuase the
publication at issue was one of public concern.676 The Court felt Dun & Bradstreet’s report was
an issue of public concern in that it “implicated strong state interest in protecting consumers and
regulating commercial transactions.” 677 Consequently, Greenmoss Builders were held to proving
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674

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 6-3
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involved.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
1-33–1-34 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010)(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). In doing so, the Court
created a “limited-purpose” public figure. Id. at 1-323. This is someone who, “By propelling
themselves into the “vortex” of public disputes, they, too, surrender some protection for their
reputation, but only insofar as the communication relates to their involvement in the dispute.” Id.
A split decision of the court means the court was split in their vote and the decision was not
unanimous. This is significant because the Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders
holding does not carry the weight of a unanimous decision.
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the actual malice standard despite Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., being a non-media defendant because
anything “less than a showing of actual malice simply exacts too high a toll on First Amendment
values.”678
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders is distinguishable from the issue at hand
because both parties in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders were neither members of
the media nor NCAA student-athletes. While there are no found defamation cases on studentathletes suing non-media defendants, there are cases of coaches and professional athletes suing
non-media defendants.
a. Public Figure Plaintiff
McNair v. NCAA is a case from the Court of Appeal of California in which Todd McNair,
assistant coach at the University of Southern California (USC), sued the NCAA for
defamation.679 The court considered McNair a limited-purpose public figure.680
In September 2009, the NCAA launched an investigation into USC following allegations
that a student-athlete, Reggie Bush, received illegal financial benefits from prospective agents,
Lloyd Lake and Michael Michaels. 681 When the NCAA issued their investigative report, the
NCAA explicitly drew attention to assistant football coach, Todd McNair. 682 The report stated
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Mcnair had an early morning phone call with Lake resulting in his knowledge of the unethical
transactions between Bush and the agents.683
The NCAA charged McNair with unethical conduct and violation of NCAA rules. 684
McNair was “prohibited from engaging in recruiting activities or interacting with prospective
student-athletes” and was placed under strict surveillance by any employer. 685 As a result,
McNair sued the NCAA for defamation. 686
The Court of Appeal of California declared McNair a limited-purpose public figure when
stating “[A] common thread in these cases is that one’s voluntary decision to pursue a career in
sports, whether as an athlete or a coach, “invites attention and comment” regarding his job
performance and thus constitutes an assumption of the risk of negative publicity.” 687 The court
declared McNair a limited-purpose pubic figure because he was a former professional athlete and
he was the assistant football coach for University of Southern California. Consequently, “he
accepted the position knowing that the football program at USC was highly publicized, and
assumed the risk of publicity, both good and bad, as it related to his public performance.” 688
Because the alleged defamatory statement focused on his role as an assistant coach, the court
declared him a limited-purpose public figure, requiring him to meet the actual malice standard. 689
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Similarly, a student-athlete also may be considered a limited-purpose public figure if the
athlete accepts a position on a high-profile football team just as McNair did in a way that was so
“highly publicized, and [he] assumed the risk of publicity, both good and bad, as it related to his
public performance.”690 The language that McNair knew the program was “highly publicized” 691
and, as such, “assumed the risk of publicity” 692 implies that a program that is not highly
publicized does not make a participant “assume the risk of publicity.” 693 Therefore, if the athlete
is associated with an environment that does not necessarily cause the student-athlete to “assume
the risk of publicity, both good and bad, as it related to his public performance,” 694 the court may
not deem the student-athlete a public figure. Ultimately, the decision is left to the discretion of a
court. 695
b. Private Person Plaintiff
The case of Moss v. Stockard illustrates the instance in which a collegiate coach was
considered a private person when she sued the University of the District of Columbia’s (UDC)
athletic director, a non-media defendant, for defamation.696
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On June 1, 1979, the UDC’s athletic director, Orby Z. Moss, hired Bessie Stockard as the
head coach for the women’s basketball team. 697 Because Stockard was already a Physical
Education Professor at UDC, she was hired as a part-time coach and compensated $9,000 for the
year.698 Her contract was re-evaluated and renewed on an annual basis.699
On March 25, 1981, Stockard learned her contract would not be renewed for the
upcoming year because of “Moss’s dissatisfactions with her handling of and accounting for
university funds disbursed to cover meal and other expenses during a three-day trip to Atlanta for
two away games.”700 When two players, Theresa Snead and Alice Butler, inquired as to why
Stockard was fired, Moss told them it was due to “misappropriation of funds.” 701 Snead testified
Moss’s statement “was just like he was saying she [Stockard] had been stealing.” 702
When Stockard sued Moss for defamation the judge declared her a private person
plaintiff.703 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals analyzed why Stockard was a private
person and not a public official or public figure. 704 Relying on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
and Rosenblatt v. Baer, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals said
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Their [public officials’] need to prove greater fault by a greater degree of factual
certainty than private plaintiffs stems from (1) the public’s strong interest in
robust and unfettered debate concerning issues related to governmental affairs,
and (2) the fact that public officials, with superior access to the media, usually are
better able than ordinary individuals to affect the outcome of those issues to
counteract effects of negative publicity. 705
The court does not have a specific definition as to who is included as a public official.706 While
Stockard is officially a government employee as she works for a government owned institution,
it is not clear how far down the hierarchy someone is to be considered a “public official.”707
Furthermore, courts have reached different conclusions as to whether “teachers in publicly
sponsored educational organizations are “public officials” for purposes of defamation law.” 708
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals described public officials as those who “have
or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs.”709 The court believed there are some instances in which a collegiate coach
might attract public interest, but this was not a case in which the public would believe Stockard
was a person who had “substantial responsibility for or control over governmental affairs.” 710
Consequently, she was considered a private person plaintiff and not a public official. 711
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The court also analyzed why Stockard was not a limited-purpose public figure under the
Waldbaum test.712 The court considered:
1. Whether the controversy to which the defamation relates was the subject to
public discussion prior to the statement.713
2. Whether a reasonable person would have expected persons beyond the
immediate participants in the dispute to feel the impact of its resolution. 714
3. The plaintiff’s role in the controversy and whether they “purposefully tr[ied]
to influence the outcome or could realistically have been expected because of
his position in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution.” 715
The court said while journalists and the basketball community may have been interested
in Stockard’s termination, the topic was hardly something that would “have substantial
ramifications for non-participants.”716 Additionally, Stockard did not try to give “her side of the
story,” nor did she attempt to use her position to influence the outcome. 717 Most significant, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals said, “Stockard’s position is markedly different from that
of other sports figures who have become so prominent ‘they unavoidably enter the limelight,’
becoming general purpose public figures.”718 Therefore, Stockard was considered a private
person plaintiff and did not have to prove actual malice against Moss, the non-media
defendant.719
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Applying the rational from Stockard to assess whether a NCAA student-athlete is a
public official, a student-athlete is also not a public official. A student-athlete is “a student whose
enrollment was solicited by a member of the athletics staff or other representative of athletics
interests with a view toward the student’s ultimate participation in the intercollegiate athletics
program.”720 Consequently, student-athletes do not meet the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals’ definition of public officials, who “have or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” 722
In regard to declaring a student-athlete a private person plaintiff, a student-athlete may be
considered such if a student-athlete has the same characteristics as Stockard. For example, a
member of a less popular sport may attract attention within her particular arena, but she may not
rise to the level of other sports figures who have become so prominent “‘they unavoidably enter
the limelight,’ becoming general purpose public figures.”723 Also significant is that the court
declared Stockard a private person because she did not try to give “her side of the story,” nor did
she attempt to use her position to influence the outcome. 724 In other words, she did not thrust
herself into the vortex of the controversy. The Gertz Court explicitly defined public figures as
persons who “occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes” and, “more commonly,” those who “have thrust themselves to the

See, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, CONST. § 3.2.4.5. The manual also states, “Any other student
becomes a student-athlete only when the student reports for an intercollegiate squad that is under
the jurisdiction of the athletics department, as specified in Constitution 3.2.4.5. A student is not
deemed a student-athlete solely on the basis of prior high school athletics participation.”
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forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved.”725 In doing so, the Court created the “limited purpose” public figure categorization.726
This is for persons who, “By propelling themselves into the ‘vortex’ of public disputes, they, too,
surrender some protection for their reputation, but only insofar as the communication relates to
their involvement in the dispute.”727 Since Stockard did not give “her side of the story” and did
not attempt to use her position to influence the outcome, she was not a limited purpose public
figure.728 In parallel, if a student-athlete was not a high profile figure and did not voluntarily
thrust herself into the vortex of the controversy, a court may declare her a private person, as the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared Stockard a private person. Such decisions
ultimately are left to the discretion of each court. 729
3. Media v. Non-Media Defendant and Their Degree of First Amendment Protection
The U.S. Supreme Court never explicitly distinguished between the protection of the
media and non-media defamation defendants.730 They have, however, ruled in a manner that
blurs the treatment of media and non-media defendants, making it unclear as to whether they are
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to be afforded the same degree of First Amendment protection.731 For example, in Gertz, Justice
Powell expressed the need to protect “publishers,” “broadcasters,” and “the media.” 732 Because
he did not explicitly state the need to protect non-media defendants, many interpreted his
opinion to mean defendants who are not “publishers,” “broadcasters,” or “the media” are not
granted the same protection as media defendants. 733 In Justice O’Connor’s Hepps opinion, she
explicitly denoted in a footnote, “Nor need we consider what standards would apply if the
plaintiff sues a non-media defendant” providing further proof the treatment of media and nonmedia defendants is, at least, murky.734 Because the Court explicitly stated when the media
requires greater First Amendment protection, but has not done so for non-media defendants,
“lower courts have definitively held [this] to mean non-media defendants are not entitled to the
same level of protection as media defendants” in defamation law suits. 735 This means,
historically, journalists have greater First Amendment protection than individuals who are not
members of the media.736 However, this too is changing as technology changes.
Determining who is considered a “member of the media” is also unclear. Snyder v.
Phelps declared, “Any effort to justify a media/nonmedia distinction rests on unstable ground,
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given the difficulty of defining with precision who belongs to the media.”737 Snyder v. Phelps
also showed a shift to focusing on the speech, itself, as opposed to the source when the ruling
stated, “And, more importantly, the Supreme Court has concluded that the “inherent worth of
speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual. Thus, for our purposes, the status of the Defendants as media or nonmedia
is immaterial.”738 While history has afforded greater protection to media, more change on the
frontier of First Amendment law is expected as technology continues to advance. 739
D. Internet Defamation
1. Arising Issues
Communications and publications via social media websites are increasingly becoming
the norm.740 With so many non-media social networking users publishing their own comments
online, many legal questions about how the current law applies to the social media arena have
arisen.741
Social media is used by members of the media as well as people who are not associated
with the media.742 They use social networks like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and
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LinkedIn to “keep in touch with friends and family, make professional connections, and
communicate their personal, political, religious, or other views.” 743 Such outlets are a platform
for potential defamation claims, making users increasingly vulnerable.744
There is not a specific area of the law that addresses “social media law.”745 Consequently,
many are left to question how the current law is applicable to the Internet world.746 However, in
defamation suits, courts have continuously treated the online arena with the same manner they
would treat a traditional publication, applying the same defamation law. 747 In “Social Media
Law: Significant Developments,” Christopher Escobedo Hart explained, “Courts have not
created brand new rules and paradigms to grapple with social media ubiquity and complexity,
but rather have consistently applied existing legal standards to the social media space,” which
“suggests that, at least in the legal world, there is little difference between online and offline
conduct.”748
In State of North Carolina v. Bishop, the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the
First Amendment in regard to online Facebook posts in a cyberbullying case. 749 During the 20112012 academic school year, classmates of Dillon Price took to Facebook to post messages
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concerning Price that “included comments and accusations about each other's sexual proclivities,
along with name-calling and insults.”750 Price’s mother feared for his well-being and reported the
Facebook posts to the police. 751 Defendant Robert Bishop was arrested and convicted of
cyberbullying.752 On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found the cyberbullying
statute unconstitutional in that it regulated protected speech.753
While State of North Carolina v. Bishop pertains to a cyberbullying statue and not
defamation, it is still relevant because “the court reasoned that there is no substantive distinction
between posting online and other traditional forms of protected speech.” 754 Specifically in regard
to online postings, the court wrote, “Such communication does not lose protection merely
because it involves the “act” of posting information online, for much speech requires an “act” of
some variety—whether putting ink to paper or paint to canvas, or hoisting a picket sign, or
donning a message-bearing jacket.”755 As a result, internet defamation should be assessed under
traditional defamation law.756 However, courts foresee a great amount of expansion in First
Amendment law due to the ever-advancing developments of technology and social media. 757
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On January 17, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held “First
Amendment defamation rules apply equally to both the institutional press and individual
speakers and writers, such as bloggers.” 758 In Obsidian Fin. Group, LLC v. Cox, Obsidian
Finance Group, LLC (Obsidian) sued Courtney Cox for defamation after she published several
blog posts in which she accused Obsidian of illegal activities connected to one of their clients. 759
The criminal activity included fraud and money-laundering.760
In that ruling, the Ninth Circuit revisited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., but acknowledge a problem in that, “This case involves the intersection
between Sullivan and Gertz, an area not yet fully explored by this Circuit, in the context of a
medium of publication—the Internet—entirely unknown at the time of those decisions.”761 This
court also said that while the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly distinguished media and
individual speakers, every circuit has.762 Specifically, the circuit courts provide the same degree
of First Amendment protection to media institutions as they do to individual speakers following
the Snyder v. Phelps ruling, which stated, “Any effort to justify a media/non-media distinction
rests on unstable ground, given the difficulty of defining with precision who belongs to the
media.”763
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The court declared the content of the blog post an issue of public concern and required
the plaintiffs prove Cox acted with actual malice. 764 This decision provided Cox, an individual
blogger unassociated with the formal press, the same degree of First Amendment protection as a
journalist.765 The ruling is significant to the media and non-media alike because, as the court
stated, “Now, all that is required is writing and reporting that commands an audience.”766
2. What Internet Defamation Means for Student-Athletes
Thanks to social media, student-athletes and their activity are readily available to the
public.767 Additionally, athletes are easy targets for online conversation. 768 While speech is
protected under the First Amendment, there are situations in which an online user may exceed
the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment. 769 In such instances, there is no form
of recourse for the student-athlete under current law.770
In the event an athlete was defamed on a social networking site, he cannot sue the
individual social media sites or the Internet Service Provider (ISP) because they are “immune
from liability for their users’ behavior by the legislative safeguards granted to ISPs through the
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Communications Decency Act [CDA] and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA].”771
Specifically, Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states, “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.” 772 The CDA exempts ISPs from civil liability when a user
posts defamatory language. 773 While actual networks like Twitter and Facebook cannot be sued
for defamatory posts made by their users, there is a case in which a NBA basketball referee sued
the individual reporter, instead, who tweeted a defamatory tweet. 774
In Spooner v. Associated Press, William H. Spooner, the referee of a National Basketball
Association (NBA) game between the Minnesota Timberwolves and the Houston Rockets, sued
Jon Krawczynski for tweeting, “Ref Bill Spooner told Rambis he’d ‘get it back’ after a bad call.
Then he made an even worse call on Rockets. That’s NBA officiating folks.” 775

771

Id. at 35.

47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1). Interactive computer service is defined as “any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users
to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”
47 U.S.C. §230(f)(2). Internet content provider is defined as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. §230(f)(3).
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Protecting the Modern Athlete on Social Media, 5 PACE INTELL. PROP., SPORTS, & ENT. L. F. 32,
42 (2015).
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No.11-cv-00642-JRT-JJK (D Minn.R.1.1(a) 2011).
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The tweet followed a call by Spooner against a Minnesota Timberwolves player, 776 after
which Krawczynski claimed he was within hearing distance and heard Spooner exchange words
with Houston coach, Kurt Rambis.777 Spooner sued the Associated Press for defamation,
claiming the tweet harmed his personal and professional reputation, resulting in disciplinary
investigation following the publication of the tweet. 778 Before the case could reach trial, the
parties settled outside court for $20,000 and the removal of the tweet from Krawencynski’s
Twitter account.779 Due to the settlement, it is still unknown as to how this situation would have
played out in a court of law. What is clear, however, is this is an increasingly gray area of law
that brings with it many questions as to how athletes will be treated in such defamation cases and
what degree of First Amendment protection will be afforded to members of the media and
individual speakers of online social media content.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to discover a number of issues. The first being whether a NCAA
student-athlete can sue a media entity, journalist, or non-media defendant for defamation. After
extensive research, this thesis found that a student-athlete can sue a media or non-media entity
for defamation. Article IV, section 2, paragraph 1 of the U.S. Constitution affords all citizens the
basic right to bring suit in a court of law. 780 It states, “The citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” 781
Additionally, a NCAA student-athlete does not contract out of a right to sue for
defamation. A student-athlete need only enter into an at-will agreement with the university by
“meet[ing] minimal academic entrance standards, become[ing] a student at the university, and
qualif[ing] as an amateur.”782 Upon entering into this agreement, a student-athlete agrees to
comply with the regulations of the university in line with the NCAA compliance regulations. 783
There is nothing in NCAA Compliance paperwork that prohibits a student-athlete from bringing
a defamation claim. 784
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Chambers, 28 S.Ct. 34 (1907).
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St. Louis U.L.J. 39, 51 (1990).
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Memorandum from Louisiana State University Compliance on Student-Athlete Packet, 7
(Academic Year 2012-2013) (on file with author).
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A student-athlete, like any plaintiff, must meet the prima facie elements of the
defamation claim.785 If a student-athlete meets those elements, it is likely the athlete has a viable
claim to bring against the defendant. 790
With proof that a student-athlete can bring a defamation claim, the next issue was to
determine whether a college athlete bringing a defamation claim would be declared a public
official, private person, or public figure plaintiff. However, with no case law found pertaining to
the defamation of a current student-athlete, this thesis used court rulings addressing coaches, a
former college athlete, high school athletes, and professional athletes to analogize how a college
student-athlete’s case may play out in court.
A student-athlete will not be considered a public official because by definition, the two
are not the same. A public official is, “Someone who holds or is invested with a public office; a
person elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government's sovereign powers.” 791 A
student-athlete is not a public official because a student-athlete is a student whose participation
represents the intercollegiate athletic program. 792 Because a student-athlete does not meet the

First, the athlete must “prove the alleged defamatory statement was published in a manner
accessible to a third party.” Second, Prove the alleged defamatory statement “cause[s] damage to
someone’s good name or reputation.” Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the Collegiate
Athlete: the Case of Failed Reporting and an NFL Drug Test, 33 SPORTS LAW. J. 51, 52 (1996)
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (5th Ed.
1984)). Third, Prove the alleged defamatory statement is false if it involves a matter of public
concern. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 2-7
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010). Finally, Prove the defendant’s negligence or actual malice in
making the statement. (Note, the standard is determined by whether the plaintiff is considered a
public figure or private person).
785
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A viable claim does not mean they will win. It simply means the claim is not frivolous.
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Official, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1259 (10th ed. 2014).
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See, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, CONST. § 3.2.4.5.
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definition of public official, the public official category is eliminated as an option in determining
the student-athlete’s plaintiff class.
Furthermore, cases seem to automatically discount the idea of a coach or athlete being
considered a public official. 794 Courts routinely declared coaches are not public officials. 796 In
O’Connor v. Burningham, Justice Nehring recalled the language of Rosenblatt v. Baer which
said a public official was one “[w]here a position in government has such apparent importance
that that public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person
who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all
government employees.”797 The coach is the leader of the team in that the coach is the “one who
instructs players in the fundamentals of a sport and directs team strategy.” 798 An athlete
is a player taking direction and instruction from the coach in that an athlete is “a person who is

See, e.g., Cottrell, 975 So. 2d at 333 (this case simply stated, “In this case, the NCAA and
Culpepper agree that neither Cottrell nor Williams is a public official or a generalpurpose public figure.” They gave no further explanation as to why the plaintiffs were not public
officials, but they did, however, elaborate on why the plaintiffs were not all-purpose figures.);
Carver, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 350–351 (the argument was made that the publication has
protection because it was of a “public official proceeding.” The report, nonetheless, was not
privileged. Further, the plaintiff was never considered a public official, only a public figure.);
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 8. (On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded. The
court first decided that petitioner was neither a public figure nor a public official under the
relevant decisions of this Court.).
794

See, e.g., Curtis Pub. Co., 388 U.S. at 140–142; O’Connor, 165 P. 3d at 1219; Rosenblatt,
383 U.S. at 86.
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O’Connor, 165 P.3d at 1216 (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86).
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MIRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coach (last
visited Feb. 21, 2017).
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trained or skilled in . . . sports.” 799 If the coach does not qualify as a public official, by
analysis, neither will an athlete.
There is case law supporting the fact that a student-athlete may be declared a private
person.800 A private person is, by definition, “Someone who does not hold public office or serve
in the military; an entity such as a corporation or partnership that is governed by private law.” 801
In Ackerman v. Paulauskas a college basketball coach was declared a private person plaintiff to a
defamation suit and, as such, was not required to meet the actual malice standard. 802 The
Superior Court of Massachusetts held that the comments at issue were not a result of Ackerman
thrusting himself into a controversy or “engaging the public in an attempt to influence the
outcome of a controversy.”803 Further, while the Telegram may have reported on Ackerman a
great deal whilst he was the basketball coach, he was still not a public figure. 804 Consequently,
the Superior Court of Massachusetts declared Ackerman a private person and did not require him
to meet the actual malice standard. 805

799

MIRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/athlete (last
visited Feb. 21, 2017).
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See, e.g., Ackerman, 25 Mass. L. Rep. 527; Cottrell, 975 So. 2d at 327.

Private Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (10th ed. 2014). The result of being
declared a private person plaintiff is that the plaintiff is not required to prove actual malice in
most circumstances. SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 6-2
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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Ackerman, 25 Mass. L. Rep. at 7.
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Similarly, in Cottrell v. NCAA, Ivy Williams was declared a private plaintiff because, as
an assistant football coach at the University of Alabama, he “was neither in such a position of
public prominence that he was in a position to influence others, or the outcome of the
controversy, nor did he enjoy regular and continuing access to the media.” 806 If a student-athlete
has similar characteristic as Ivy Williams in that he is not in a “position of public prominence”
and his position cannot “influence others, or the outcome of the controversy,” even if he did
“enjoy regular and continuing access to the media,” he may be a private person plaintiff. 807
Relevant private person plaintiff case law centers around college coaches bringing
defamation suits.808 A coach instructs players and directs the team. 809 An athlete takes
direction, instruction, and training from the coach. 810 If the coach, under these circumstances, is
declared a private plaintiff, then a student-athlete may also be declared a private plaintiff in the
same situation.
The court ultimately has the discretion whether to declare a student-athlete a private
person plaintiff. 811 Case law trends show coaches and professional athletes involved with highpublicity sports are generally declared limited-purpose public figures, logically linking a studentathlete in a sport that receives high publicity to being declared a limited-purpose public figure as
806

Cottrell, 975 So. 2d at 327.
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See, e.g., Cottrell, 975 So. 2d at 327; Ackerman, 25 Mass. L. Rep. at 527.
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MIRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coach (last
visited Feb. 21, 2017).
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MIRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/athlete (last
visited Feb. 21, 2017).
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Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: The Case of Failed Reporting and
an NFL Drug Test, 33 SPORTS LAW. J. 51, 53–54 (1996).
126

well.812 However, other case law trends also show that coaches and professional athletes are
“simply” public figures and not put into an all-purpose or limited-purpose public figure
category.813 What is clear is that, “athletes and coaches are either ‘all-purpose’ public figures or
so-called ‘limited-purpose’" public figures.”814
Recall Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. was the seminal case in explaining who is considered a
public figure and how they differ from a private plaintiff.815 The Court said a public figure is one
who: “assume[d] special prominence in the affairs of society and to have assume[d] special
prominence in the resolution of public questions,”817 “voluntarily exposed themselves to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood,” 818 and has greater access to media outlets,
affording them a greater opportunity to defend themselves to the public against defamatory
speech.819 A person, however, will likely not meet all these public figure descriptions because
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See, e.g., Kirk, 1988 Tenn. App. at 13; Sarandrea, 30 Pa.D. at 212; Maynard, 191 W. Va. at
603; Faigin, 184 F.3d 76; McGarry, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 115.
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See, e.g., Cohane, 2013 U.S. Dist. at 191; Pippen, 734 F.3d at 612.
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Sarandrea, 30 Pa.D. at 212. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co., 87 S.Ct. at 210; Barry, 587 F.
Supp. at 1110; Barsarich v. Rodegheron, 312 N.E.2d at 739.
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ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 15-20–
15-21 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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Id. at 5-21 n. 151–152 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 5-21 n. 154 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–345).
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Id. at 5-21 n. 153 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344).
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situations differ factually on a case by case basis. 820 For this reason, lower courts have treated
these factors merely as guidelines.821
Many courts “have concluded professional and collegiate athletes and coaches are at least
limited purpose public figures.”822 While courts apply their own unique factors, the common
trends amongst the courts’ rulings are that they find a public figure to be someone who
voluntarily thrusts himself into the public controversy,823 invited public attention, thus
necessarily assuming the risk of defamation,824 and had greater access to the media.825 Using that
case law as a guide, one can conclude that if a student-athlete voluntarily thrusts himself into a
public controversy,826 invited the public attention assuming the risk of defamation, and had
greater access to the media to defend their reputation,827 a court will likely declare him a public
figure.
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Id. at 5-21.
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Id.
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McGarry, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 115 (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 412; Ackerman, 25 Mass. L. Rep. at 1; Cottrell, 975 So. 2d at
327; Sarandrea, 30 Pa.D. at 210; SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 5-24–5-25 n.175 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010); Id. at 5-25; Id. at 5-23–5-24 n.173.
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See, e.g., Cottrell, 975 So. 2d at 328; Sarandrea, 30 Pa.D. at 210; Maynard, 191 W.Va. at
603; McGarry, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 115.
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See, e.g., Maynard, 191 W.Va. at 602; SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS 5-24–5-25 n.175 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
826

See, e.g., Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 412; SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 5-24–5-25 n.175 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010); Id. at 5-25; Id. at 5-23–5-24 n.173.
827

See, e.g., SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-24–5-25
n.175 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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As a public figure, the student-athlete would be required to prove actual malice. Recall,
the Court defined actual malice as “publication with knowledge that the offending statement is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.”828 As such, more protection would
be provided to the media against being held liable for harming the reputation of the studentathlete on a matter of public concern. 829
Knowing a student-athlete’s plaintiff status and burden of proving fault is important
because we live in a time when college athletes are trained to talk to the media after a game. 830
Understanding plaintiff classification of a student-athlete helps universities and athletes know at
what point the student-athletes seal their fate in becoming limited-purpose public figures related
to athletics. While there are several factors contributing to athletes being declared public figures,
one way to attempt to protect themselves from crossing the threshold into the public figure realm
is by not “thrusting themselves into the vortex” of the controversy. 831 In other words, in the event
athletes find themselves at the center of defamatory speech, they can help their plaintiff status by
refraining from commenting on the controversy and keeping themselves distanced from the
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ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-25
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254).
829

Id. at 1-30—1-31(quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254).The justices understood the
difficulty in a journalist’s job of trying to report to the public while still trying to quote speakers
verbatim. Id. “So long as the gist of a quotation is correct, errors that do not materially change
the meaning of the statement do no constitute “actual malice” even when they are made
deliberately.” Id.
See, e.g., Ron Higgins, LSU Tiger’s learn how to talk the talk, THE TIMES PICAYUNNE, Aug.
9, 2014, http://www.nola.com/lsu/index.ssf/2014/08/_rons_fast_break.html.
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An individual can become a public figure “by propelling themselves into the “vortex” of
public disputes, they, too, surrender some protection for their reputation, but only insofar as the
communication relates to their involvement in the dispute.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON
DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-323 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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conversation.832 This vortex concept is important for college athletes to understand so they can
know what they should and should not address when dealing with the media. However, it is
important to keep in mind that being involved in the conversation at issue is not the only factor in
being declared a public figure. A court will also consider the degree to which the student-athlete
invited the public attention, thus necessarily assuming the risk of defamation833 and how much
access the student-athlete had to the media to defend her reputation.834
On the flip side, understanding how the student-athlete may be classified in a defamation
case is important for journalists because it helps them gauge their degree of First Amendment
protection when reporting on a student-athlete. Under First Amendment theory, is it well known
that speech which “defames a private person at least negligently and a public official or figure
with actual malice” is not protected by the First Amendment.835 Thomas Scanlan, unraveled the
Millian principle advocating for a government that could maintain authority over its citizens
while affording them the freedom of expression.836 Scanlan believed violating the Millian
principle837 took away “the right of citizens to make up their own minds.”838 However, Scanlan,

832

See, e.g. Moss v. Stockard, 580 App. D.C. at 1032.
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RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18
(2003).
836

Thomas Scanlan, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 214 (1972).

In 1972, Thomas Scanlon developed the “Millian principle” in which he outlined two types of
harms that prove the negative effect of regulating citizens’ speech. 837 These two harms are “(a)
harms to certain individuals which consist in their coming to have false beliefs as a result of
those acts of expression; (b) harmful consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts of
837
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himself could not deny that “acts of expression [that] bring about injury or damage as a direct
physical consequence” should not be protected. In fact, he wrote
It seems clear that when harms brought about in this way are intended by the
person performing an act of expression, or when he is reckless or negligent with
respect to their occurrence, then no infringement of freedom of expression is
involved in considering them as possible grounds for criminal penalty or civil
action.839
Put simply, taking action against speech that causes harm does not infringe on the freedom of
speech. 840 As such, it is essential for journalists to understand when such legal action can be
brought against them specifically as it pertains to reporting on student-athletes. Knowing under
what circumstances an athlete will most likely be declared a limited-purpose public figure
affords the journalists a higher level of protection. 841 Most important, understanding their degree
of protection prevents a chilling effect on the journalists and affords them the liberty to report
more freely.842

expression, where the connection between the acts of expression and the subsequent harmful acts
consist merely in the fact that the act of expression left the agents to believe (or increased their
tendency to believe) these acts to be worth performing.” Thomas Scanlan, A Theory of Freedom
of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213 (1972).
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This standard provided more protection to the media against being held liable for harming the
reputation of public figures on a matter of public concern. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON
DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-30—1-31 (Keith Voelker, 4th ed.
2010) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254).
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v. Sullivan, 20 ROGERS WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015).
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Recall, a cornerstone of Free Speech Theory is that the truth will prevail in the
marketplace of ideas. 843 Leaving the availability to ascertain the truth to the will of the
government or authoritative censorship does not ensure truth will prevail. 844 Thomas Scanlan
believed “the authority of governments to restrict the liberty of citizens in order to prevent
certain harms does not include authority to prevent these harms by controlling people's sources
of information to insure that they will maintain certain beliefs.”845 The marketplace of ideas
theory protects all ideas and citizens’ ability to freely express those ideas in an effort to prevent
authoritative institutions from censoring truth.846 This allows citizens to have control over their
expression.847 Additionally, under the watchdog theory, it is important for journalists to
understand their freedoms and limitations so they can “serve as a neutral forum for debate, a
marketplace of ideas.”848
Finally, with the advancement of the Internet, communication and publications via social
media websites are increasingly becoming the norm, leaving many questions surrounding the
Internet, social media, and defamation left unanswered. 849 In defamation suits, nonetheless,

843
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Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (internal quotation marks
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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE LAW: A GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNICATION STUDENTS AND
PROFESSORS 39 (Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart, 2013).
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courts have continuously treated the online arena with the same manner they would treat a
traditional publication, applying the same defamation law precedents.850
Student-athletes’ posts on social media pages can easily be intercepted by journalists and
lay social network users. 851 This makes athletes vulnerable targets for online conversation. 852
There is no clear answer as to how a defamation case will play out in a court of law surrounding
a student-athlete and social media. What is clear, however, is this is an increasingly gray area of
law that brings with it many questions as to how athletes will be treated in such defamation cases
and what degree of First Amendment protection will be afforded to members of the media and
individual speakers of online social media content. More change on the frontier of First
Amendment law is expected as technology continues to advance. 853
Based on Holt,854 and cases involving coaches and professional athletes, student-athletes
may be declared a private plaintiff or a public figure depending on the circumstances
surrounding the claim. 855 Although cases do not provide a bright-line rule as to whether a
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235 (2016-2017).
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Protecting the Modern Athlete on Social Media, 5 PACE INTELL. PROP., SPORTS, & ENT. L. F. 32,
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238 (2016-2017).
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See, Holt, 590 F. Supp. at 408
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See, e.g., Cottrell, 975 So. 2d at 327; Ackerman, 25 Mass. L. Rep. at 527; Sarandrea, 30 P. D
at 212; Curtis, 87 S.Ct. at 210;Barry, 587 F. Supp. at 1110; Basarich, 321 N.E.2d at 739;
Additionally, many courts “have concluded professional and collegiate athletes and coaches are
at least limited-purpose public figures.” McGarry, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 115 (emphasis added).
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student-athlete is a public figure who must prove actual malice or a private person who must
prove negligence, the case law indicates that the Gertz856 factors are consistently applied by
some courts as guidelines to determine whether a coach or professional athlete is considered a
public figure or private person. This means courts have consistently considered:
1. The plaintiff’s access to the media, and
2. The degree to which the person “thrust himself into the vortex of this public
issue.”857
Other courts, however, have relied on the issue being one of public controversy, or what
the court discretionally views as acceptable public discussion. 858 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns,
Inc., defined public controversy as “a dispute that in fact has received public attention because its
ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct participants.” 859 Specifically, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, ask the following questions in determining if a plaintiff is a
limited-purpose public figure:
1. Is there a public controversy?
2. Has the plaintiff played a sufficiently central role in the controversy?
3. Is the alleged defamatory statement germane to the plaintiff’s participation in
the controversy?860
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See, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
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SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-58 (Keith Voelker, 4th
ed. 2010).
Id. at 5-59. According to sack on defamation, “An investigation into alleged industry
corruption or drug dealing would, for example, meet this [the District of Columbia’s] test.” Id.
See, Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1287.
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SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-23–5-24 n. 173 (Keith
Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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Several circuits have incorporated the Walbaum factors into their defamation rulings.861
To align with current practices of the circuit courts, simultaneously uphold the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in Gertz, and satisfy the concerns of First Amendment theory, this
author’s best recommended practice is to combine both the Gertz factors and Walbaum
factors–or those factors similar to Walbaum adopted by other circuit courts–to create a
roadmap to classifying a plaintiff as a public figure.862
Gertz should not be replaced by Waldbaum, outright, because Gertz accounts for the
plaintiff’s degree of access to the media. 863 This is an area Walbaum does not include in its
three-pronged test.864 Gertz found this significant because the first remedy to a defamatory
statement is to “minimize its [the statement’s] adverse impact on reputation.” 865 Public figures
have greater access to media thus affording them greater protection from defamatory
statements.866 In contrast, private persons have less access to communication channels giving
them less ability to remedy the situation and, consequently, increasing the risk of injury from the
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For example, the Second Circuit said the plaintiff must have (1) Successfully invited public
attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is the subject of
litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related to the subject of the
litigation; (3) assumed a position of prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintained
regular and continuing access to the media. Id. at 5-24–5-25 n.175. The Sixth Circuit “(1) a
public controversy must exist; and (2) the nature and extent of the individual’s participation in
the particular controversy must be ascertained.” Id. at 5-25
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
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Supra, note 851.
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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defamatory statements. 867 The emphasis placed upon access to the media by the Gertz court is a
direct parallel to the criticism of the marketplace of ideas theory.
This prong is parallel to the marketplace of ideas theory because the economic
marketplace and the marketplace of ideas recognize that the rich and people of greater public
stature have an increased level of participation in both the economic marketplace and the
marketplace of ideas.868 Gertz used this increased access to distinguish public figures from
private persons. Public officials and public figures’ increased access to communication outlets
affords them the ability to “minimize its adverse impact on reputation,” and, in turn, affords them
greater protection against defamatory statements. 869
There is, however, overlap between the Gertz and Walbaum factors. The degree to which
the person “thrust[s] himself into the vortex of this public issue” 870 and whether the plaintiff
played a sufficiently central role in the controversy871 ultimately have the same goal—determine
if the plaintiff was involved in the issue upon which the defamatory statement surrounds. In
essence, the Walbaum factors reiterate the Gertz factors, accounting for their vortex concerns.

867

Id.

868

RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1, at 2-16.1, 2-16.4
(2008).
869

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.

870

Id. at 349.
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SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-23–5-24 n. 173 (Keith
Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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Walbaum departs from Gertz by adding the issue of public controversy. 872 It is only
when the plaintiff voluntarily and publicly subjects himself to an event that is not a
“controversy” that a person sufficiently thrusts himself into the vortex for purposes of being
classified as a limited-purpose public figure.873 While Walbaum still accounts for the vortex
aspect of Gertz, adding the issue of public controversy aligns the Walbaum test with First
Amendment concerns.
Once again reflecting the marketplace of ideas, New York Times v. Sullivan accounted for
the necessity of free speech in the marketplace and the ability to allow the truth to prevail. The
Court stated, people are not only entitled to “speak one’s mind, but also the freedom to be
informed about public issues.” 874 New York Times expanded the marketplace of ideas to protect
ideas and information. 875 Applying the marketplace of idea premise that truth will prevail
through open conversation, Justice Brennan also indicated that citizens should be allowed to
discuss public matters even if those conversations led to unpleasant thoughts and reactions. 876 It
was this way of thinking that led the Court to afford greater First Amendment protection to

Id. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., defined public controversy as “a dispute that in fact
has received public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct
participants.” Id. at 5-59.
872

Id. at 5-60. A common concern is the concept of “bootstrapping.” This means a journalist has
given a person or controversy so much press that it forces the person of interest into being a
limited-purpose public figure. This is not an acceptable act to essentially create a public figure,
especially if the topic is a private concern. This concept implies the possibility of an involuntary
public figure. Because there is no such recognized category, it would be very rare to find an
involuntary public figure. Id. at 5-62.
873

874

David A. Anderson, The Promises of New York Times v. Sullivan, 20 ROGERS WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2015).
875

Id. at 23.

876

N.Y. Times Co, 376 U.S. at 270.
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speech.877 The Court feared that limiting open debate in an effort to avoid the accusation of
defaming another’s character would create a chilling effect on public conversation and public
issues.878 This idea of creating an open atmosphere for public conversation is a direct application
of the marketplace of ideas. 879
While combining the Gertz and Walbaum factors is a recommended roadmap to
determining whether a student-athlete plaintiff is a public figure, it is important to keep in mind
that the Court recognized a person will likely not meet all these public figure descriptions
because situations differ factually on a case by case basis. 880 This is why lower courts have
treated these factors merely as applicable guidelines. 881 As such, this author recommends
applying the Gertz and Walbaum factors and determining plaintiff classification based on the
totality of the circumstances in order to uphold current circuit court practices, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s intention for Gertz, as well as First Amendment theory.
While case law shows the classification of a student-athlete plaintiff in a defamation suit
will either be a private person or public figure, the ultimate decision is left to the discretion of the

877

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 1-6
(Keith Voelker, 4th ed. 2010).
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David A. Anderson, The Promises of New York Times v. Sullivan, 20 ROGERS WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2015).
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Id. at 21.

880

SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 5-21 (Keith Voelker, 4th
ed. 2010).
881

Id.
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court on a case-by-case basis.882 Courts have not given an umbrella determination declaring all
athletes public figures and tend to determine this on the facts of each individual case. 883 What is
clear, however, is that protecting speech under the First Amendment is a priority.

882

Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the Collegiate Athlete: The Case of Failed Reporting and
an NFL Drug Test, 33 SPORTS LAW. J. 51, 53–54 (1996).
883

Id.
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